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ABSTRACT 
 
Every day, individuals are bombarded with readily available information, not all 
of which is accurate. Unfortunately, people make all kinds of decisions based on this 
faulty information, such as whether they should vaccinate their children, who to vote for, 
or what medical treatment to select. Furthermore, much research has established that it is 
extremely difficult to alter people’s false beliefs and that correcting false beliefs can 
backfire. One promising approach (Horne et al., 2015) is actually to not address the false 
belief per se, and instead focus on individuals’ decision-making processes associated with 
those beliefs. For example, when deciding whether to vaccinate one’s children, one must 
weigh the possible risks of a vaccine (including, possibly, the false belief that vaccines 
cause autism) and the risk of the diseases that they prevent. Horne and colleagues found 
that focusing attention on disease risk led to changes in attitudes towards vaccines 
without explicitly addressing people’s false beliefs.   
In Studies 1 and 2, I replicated and extended this approach in the context of 
vaccination. Study 1 directly replicated Horne et al (2015). As predicted, a focus on 
disease risk was more effective than an intervention that directly countered false beliefs 
about vaccines and autism. Study 2 extended this line of research with three specific 
aims: (1) again replicate the Horne et al (2015) and Study 1 findings, (2) address a 
potential confound in the earlier work, and (3) test a combined correction approach. 
Specifically, the earlier disease risk condition in the original studies included pictures and 
was significantly longer than the autism correction condition. Thus, Study 2 included a 
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more thorough autism correction condition. Overall, there was no differential impact of 
the various interventions on attitudes and beliefs about vaccination, suggesting that the 
impact of addressing disease risk may not be robust.    
The third study in this dissertation used a similar approach to Horne et al (2015) 
and Studies 1 and 2 but applied to a different context; the safety of human consumption 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Specifically, Studies 3a and 3b addressed a 
common misperception about the safety of GMOs in food. Study 3a found a marginal 
effect of a GMO explanation condition (designed to parallel the disease risk condition 
seen in Studies 1 and 2 and proposed by Horne et al (2015)) on individual beliefs about 
GMOs. Additionally, the GMO explanation condition was the most effective at altering 
GMO behavior/intentions scale items and individual beliefs about the environmental 
impact of GMOs. Finally, Study 3b was a preregistered replication of Study 3a, with a 
larger sample size (n = 692). The results of Study 3b suggested that a GMO explanation 
condition designed to parallel the disease risk condition, was successful at altering 
individual attitudes, beliefs, and behavior/intentions toward GMOs. These findings 
further support that effective misinformation correction approaches may applicable to 
different contexts when focusing on the risks associated with failing to engage in a 
certain behavior and the influence it has on the individual and society.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Now more than ever, with the emergence of smartphones, iPads, and other 
handheld computers, individuals can access massive amounts of information with just the 
swipe of a finger. Unfortunately, in the current era of “fake news” and “alternative facts,” 
not all readily available information is accurate, and individuals are required to 
distinguish between what information is true and what is false. There are many different 
sources of inaccurate – or false – information. Although we cannot control the types or 
amount of information we are exposed to, we can control where and what kind of 
information we actively seek out. Typically, individuals search for information in sources 
that they themselves trust, even if the “trusted” source is not credible in an objective, 
scientific sense. This approach is problematic when the information provided is 
inaccurate. That individual is then unknowingly left believing in misinformation. 
Lewandowsky and colleagues (2012) note that misinformation can have various sources, 
including: rumors, media, religion, politics, family, and the internet. Regardless of their 
origins, beliefs -- regardless of whether they are true or false -- influence how individuals 
evaluate various elements of the world (i.e., the self, different topics of the world). 
Furthermore, holding false beliefs differs from ignorance, which is the absence of 
information or knowledge on a certain topic or issue (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
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Once individuals hold a false belief, they tend to adhere to that belief even when 
explicitly told that their belief is incorrect (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & 
Cook, 2012). Because false beliefs can have serious consequences for behavior, there is a 
large body of research that addresses how misinformation is most effectively corrected 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Stanovich & West, 2000). Perhaps 
the most consistent finding across this large body of research is that correcting false 
beliefs turns out to be, perhaps surprisingly, extremely difficult.  
This dissertation investigates different methods for attempting to correct 
misinformation.  Specifically, I focus on two relatively common false beliefs: the belief 
that vaccines cause autism, and the belief that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
are unhealthy for human consumption. I elected to focus on these two topics because 
decisions made about them have important societal consequences. Furthermore, there is a 
large body of research on correcting false beliefs about vaccines yet many tested 
approaches have not been successful. I test one approach that was found to have some 
success (Horne, Powell, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2015; discussed in detail below). Unlike 
the issue of vaccines and autism, there is little research on correcting misinformation in 
the context of GMOs. I test whether or not the underlying principles for successful 
vaccine misinformation correction might be applied to this new context.  
Why is Misinformation Correction Difficult? 
Several cognitive and motivational biases underlie the difficulty individuals may 
have in changing their minds once they hold a false belief. First, memory biases (in 
particular, a bias called the “continued-influence effect”) may impact people’s ability to 
encode, remember, and use new information.  Second, there is a tendency to value 
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information derived from personal experience of first-hand accounts compared to 
statistical information. Given that many false beliefs may arise initially from personal 
encounters, people may not attend to misinformation correction methods that provide 
empirical evidence. Third, people are often overconfident in their beliefs and this, too, 
may lead to ignoring new information. Finally, individuals often reasoning about 
information in a biased manner because they have motivations to maintain their beliefs, 
sometimes even when they are false. Below, I provide a brief introduction to each of 
these potential influences on misinformation correction. 
Continued-Influence Effect 
The continued-influence effect is a phenomenon in which initially learned 
information is difficult to delete from memory (de Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007; Wilkes 
& Leatherbarrow, 1988). Thus, even when new, correct information is presented, 
individuals tend to continue to remember and believe what they initially learned. In a 
classic study of the continued influence effect, Johnson and Seifert (1994) presented 
participants with a news story that contained misinformation. For example, one story was 
about a fire in a warehouse. Initially, it was reported that there were flammables in the 
warehouse. Then, the misinformation was corrected to state that the initial report was in 
error. Regardless of when the misinformation that was corrected (either immediately after 
presented with misinformation or later), participants continued to make inferences about 
the fire based on that misinformation. It was especially difficult for participants to update 
their memories of the story when the false information was necessary to support the 
causal structure of the story. Furthermore, if a new causal structure was provided, 
participants were better at updating their memories. This set of experiences both nicely 
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illustrate the continued-influence effect, and also suggest that one way of reducing the 
impact of discredited information is to provide readers with a clear causal explanation 
that does not rely on that false information.  
Rich and Zaragoza (2016) extended this line of research and found that implied 
misinformation was more difficult to correct than explicit misinformation. They argued 
that this might be for two reasons: that it is easier to notice the mismatch between the 
correction and the misinformation when it explicit, and also because self-generated 
misinformation is more difficult to correct. This study, too, provides some guidance 
regarding the continued influence of misinformation. In particular, approaches that first 
explicitize and acknowledge what a person believes and then corrects that belief might be 
more effective in misinformation correction. 
Preference for Narrative Reasoning over Abstract Numerical Reasoning 
Another possible mechanism for the persistence of false beliefs is that, in some 
contexts, false beliefs may be learned through personal sources such as friends or familiar 
news providers or through personal experience. For example, many individuals who 
believe that vaccines cause autism report that they learned this information through 
personal social networks and, in particular, often know someone who they believe 
contracted autism due to vaccination (Professor & Niemeyer, 2004). However, one 
common approach to correcting false beliefs about vaccines and autism is to provide 
statistical data demonstrating that vaccination is not associated with autism and that there 
are few serious potential side effects of vaccination (CDC, 2015). 
Unfortunately, people tend to hold favor concrete, personal narratives in making 
judgments and decisions over statistical information (e.g., Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; 
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Reinard, 1988; Taylor and Thompson, 1982). One early demonstration of this 
phenomenon (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977) asked University of Michigan undergraduates 
(primarily prospective psychology majors) enrolled in introduction to psychology what to 
select courses that they planned to take. They were randomly assigned to a statistical 
condition that provided mean course ratings or a face-to-face condition. In general, 
undergraduates were influenced by face-to-face interactions when making their decisions, 
but not by course ratings. Borgida and Nisbett (1977) argued that this was due to the 
vividness of the concrete information over the abstract quantitative information. 
Numerous other studies have found that individuals tend to value concrete and personal 
information over abstract statistical information (even though, when explicitly comparing 
the two types of information people often report that they find statistical information 
more persuasive) (Allen & Priess, 1997). 
There are several reasons why abstract, statistical information may hold less 
weight in judgments and decisions relative to concrete, narrative information. As Borgida 
and Nisbett (1977) argued, narrative information is more concrete and vivid. Second, 
people may find it easier to identify with an individual rather than identifying with a 
“statistically average person.” Anecdotal experiences warrant more of an emotional 
response than statistical information, and thus might be especially persuasive (Fagerlin, 
Wang, & Ubel, 2005). In general, narrative, anecdotal information promotes and supports 
heuristic, experiential reasoning. In contrast, processing statistical information may 
require more effortful, analytic thinking. Another factor that might lead to the individuals 
valuing narrative reasoning, therefore, might be “cognitive miserliness” or avoiding 
cognitive effort required to process data (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).    
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Several factors influence how impactful a narrative is (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007). 
In general, the source of the narrative has a major influence on whether or not they are 
persuasive. If the source is trusted, viewed as an expert, and similar to the receiver then 
the message is deemed more persuasive. Narratives are also more influential when 
addressing issues in which scientific reasoning may be limited (i.e., religion, personal 
values, morality, etc.) (Polkinghorne, 1988). Additionally, some groups (e.g., African 
Americans, Mexican Americans) respond better to a more narrative based form of 
communication, specifically when promoting health related behavior (Yoo, Kreuter, Lai, 
& Fu, 2014; Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; Murphy, Frank, Chatterjee, & Baezconde-
Garbanati, 2014).   
The review above provides some potential mechanisms by which providing 
individuals with statistical information (about, say, the safety of vaccines or GMO’s) may 
not be very persuasive, at least alone. Some research has examined the methods to 
increase the relative salience and value individuals place on statistical information. One 
finding is that presenting quantitative data in graphical format may increase attention to 
that information (Fagerlin, Wang, & Ubel, 2005; Chua, Yates, & Shah, 2006). In the 
current set of studies, misinformation correction approaches contained both narratives 
and graphical information to maximize their likely effectiveness. 
Overconfidence & Belief Superiority 
         Another reasoning bias that could impact how individuals perceive new 
information is people’s general tendency to be overconfident about their level of 
knowledge and skills in their cognitive, social abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Moore 
& Healy, 2008). One consequence of their overconfidence can be adherence to ignorance 
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that they do not have adequate knowledge or expertise underlying their beliefs (Dunning, 
2011). If so, then people who are especially overconfident in their beliefs in controversial 
domains may be most likely to hold those false beliefs. In fact, Motta, Callaghan, and 
Sylvester (2018) recently tested the possibility that individual differences in 
overconfidence would be associated with the belief that vaccines cause autism. They 
found that more than a third of participants rated their level of knowledge about the cause 
of autism to be higher than those of doctors and scientists. As predicted, these individuals 
were most likely to believe that vaccines cause autism (Motta, Callaghan, & Sylvester, 
2018).  
 Related to the Dunning-Kruger effect is the notion of “belief superiority” (Raimi 
& Leary, 2014). Belief superiority is defined as “the belief that one’s own beliefs or 
opinions are more correct that other viewpoints” (Raimi & Leary, 2014; pp. 76). 
Individuals differ in the extent to which they hold belief superiority, and this individual 
difference may be related to the degree to which they overestimate their own knowledge 
(Hall & Raimi, 2018). Individuals who have high levels of belief superiority also hold 
more polarized views. 
 In sum, susceptibility to overconfidence and belief superiority may both impact 
the extent to which individuals might be amenable to belief change and explain why 
those individuals who hold false beliefs about polarizing topics may especially be 
susceptible to holding false beliefs. 
Motivated Reasoning 
The theory of motivated reasoning is that “motivation may affect reasoning 
through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, 
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constructing, and evaluating beliefs” (Kunda, 1990, pp. 480). Motivations, according to a 
classic review by Kunda (1990), can include both a motivation to be accurate (e.g., James 
& Van Ryzin, 2017) or a motivation to come to a particular conclusion. Each type of 
motivation can influence cognitive processing. The motivation to be accurate without a 
preference for any particular conclusion leads to relatively high-quality reasoning 
processes. In contrast, the motivation to come to a desired conclusion leads to the use of 
biased cognitive strategies (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006; James & Van Ryzin, 
2017). Many types of motives may underlie the general motivation to arrive at a specific 
conclusion: protecting one’s self-esteem, viewing oneself in a positive light, or viewing 
other individuals or events in a specific manner, desire to persuade, agreement with a 
peer group, self-image, and self-preservation (Epley & Gilovich, 2016; Kunda, 1990).  
Klaczynski (2000) extended the research on motivated reasoning by proposing a 
model that highlights the cognitive and motivational components underlying biased 
reasoning. This model of what Klaczynski refers to as “theory-motivated reasoning” -- 
the failure of individuals to reason in a way that is Independent of their beliefs -- is 
comprised of multiple components; analytic and heuristic information processing systems 
(Klaczynski, 2000). Analytic processing “relies on the abilities (e.g., scientific 
reasoning)” and “are often normatively prescribed for sound decision making” while 
heuristic processing is “preconscious, rapid, and effortless” and judgments made using 
this type of processing are considered more “appealing because (individuals) ‘feel’ 
intuitively correct” (Klaczynski, 2000, pp. 1348; Epstein, 1994). According to this model, 
analytic processing is typically used when individuals are presented with information that 
is incongruent with their beliefs while information that is congruent with an individual’s 
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beliefs are processed heuristically. Based on this model, an individual who holds the false 
belief “vaccines cause autism” may reject views that argue “vaccines do not cause 
autism” in order to preserve his or her initial theory about vaccines (Klaczynski, 2000). 
The literature on motivated reasoning is vast and there are a plethora of 
underlying motives and consequent cognitive biases. Below, I limit my discussion to one 
motive that may have major impact on reasoning about false beliefs and their correction 
is the motive of avoiding or reducing cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Following a 
discussion of cognitive dissonance, I discuss a single cognitive reasoning bias most likely 
relevant to the evaluation of misinformation correction messages: confirmation bias 
(Wason, 1960). 
Cognitive Dissonance 
        Cognitive dissonance involves holding or displaying multiple inconsistent thoughts, 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Festinger (1957) argued that cognitive dissonance leads 
to feelings of discomfort or unease. Therefore, one of the motives that impact motivated 
reasoning is the goal of reducing or avoiding feelings of dissonance (Zunda & Sinclair, 
1999).  
In general, people align their beliefs with their behavior (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 
1999). For example, someone who believes that GMOs are unsafe would choose not to 
purchase or consume GMOs. When one is faced with new information (for example, that 
GMOs are actually safe for consumption) that is inconsistent with the behavior of 
avoiding GMOs, they will feel discomfort and cognitive stress (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-
Jones & Mills, 1999). Therefore, they may engage in motivated reasoning with the goal 
of discrediting the new and contradictory information (Keller & Block, 1999). Some 
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research classifies this type of reasoning as a form of “identity self-defense” -- that is, 
individuals are unconsciously motivated to avoid factual information if that information 
is contrary to their “identified group” (Kahan, 2013; Cohen, Bastardi, Sherman, Hsu, 
McGoey, & Ross, 2007). Alternatively, they may reconcile their behaviors with the new 
information by creating cognitive consonance (for example, in the context of GMOs, 
individuals may reconcile behavioral and attitude inconsistencies by consuming GMOs in 
moderation rather than avoiding them entirely). This reconciliation of cognitive 
dissonance through cognitive consonance specifically occurs when individuals highlight 
the positive aspects of their decisions while deemphasizing the negative aspects 
(Festinger, 1964; Aronson, 1969).  
Confirmation Bias 
One cognitive bias associated with motivated reasoning is confirmation bias. 
Confirmation bias is seeking out evidence that is in favor of your desired outcome and 
avoiding or criticizing or avoiding/not seeking out evidence that is in support of your 
desired outcome (Wason, 1960).    
One classic demonstration of confirmation bias is the Lord, Ross, and Lepper 
(1979) study of belief polarization. Researchers hypothesized that beliefs would remain 
polarized when presenting individuals with information that is inconclusive or debatable. 
Researchers gave participants questionnaires about their views regarding capital 
punishment. Participants were then asked to evaluate one of two empirical studies about 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment; one of these studies found a positive impact of 
capital punishment and the other did not. Finally, participants were again assessed about 
their attitude toward capital punishment. Lord, Ross, and Lepper found that individuals 
   
 
11 
 
were more convinced by evidence that was consistent with their prior beliefs. Indeed, 
regardless of which study they read and their prior beliefs, participants believed that the 
empirical study supported their beliefs. This tendency to focus on information that 
supports or confirms what an individual already believes is sometimes referred to as 
confirmation bias.  
In addition to criticizing information that is not consistent with one’s beliefs, 
confirmation bias is associated with the failure to engage with information that 
contradicts one’s beliefs. This aspect of confirmation bias is sometimes referred to as 
“selective exposure” (Earl & Nisson, 2015; Jonas, Schulz-Hardy, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; 
Snyder & Swann, 1978). “Selective exposure enables people to defend their attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviors by avoiding information likely to challenge them and seeking 
information likely to support them” (Hall, Albarracin, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, & 
Merrill, 2009, pp. 2). Furthermore, selective exposure in the context of misinformation 
(specifically, misinformation presented online) has the potential to create “filter bubbles” 
-- “a self-reinforcing pattern of narrowing exposure that reduces user creativity, learning, 
and connecting” (Nguyen, Hui, Harper, Terveen, & Konstan, 2014, pp. 677; Pariser, 
2011). For example, individuals who seek out information confirming the false belief 
“vaccines cause autism”, are less likely to be presented with information incongruent to 
their viewpoint. This constant repetition of misinformation can actually strengthen the 
individual memory for the misinformation (Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005).  
Related to selective exposure is myside bias. In myside bias, individuals are more 
likely to seek out evidence and form arguments supporting their personal viewpoint 
rather than attending to evidence that supports an alternative viewpoint (Stanovich, West, 
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& Toplak, 2013). Specifically, myside bias is the tendency individuals have to “ignore 
information of the side that one disagrees with...in favor of information that supports 
one’s position ‘myside’” (Wolfe, 2012, pp. 478). Confirmation and myside bias share the 
characteristic that they both involve an inability to separate prior beliefs from analytical 
evaluation of new information (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007). However, the slight 
difference between the two phenomena is that myside bias specifically occurs when 
individuals seeks out information that confirms what they already believe while ignoring 
information that is incongruent with their beliefs (Perkins, Bushey, & Farady, 1986; 
Baron, 2000). Furthermore, myside bias often refers to the contexts in which individuals 
generate an argument and present it to others with bias, rather than merely evaluating 
information. In general, myside bias is strongest when an individual has strong beliefs, 
the more neutral or unsure an individual is on a certain issue, the more likely they are to 
evaluate information in a more balanced manner (Sawicki et al., 2011). If an individual 
who has strong beliefs about vaccines causing autism, they may generate a coherent 
narrative about this topic that ignores counterevidence. 
In summary, individuals who are prone to evaluating information based on 
whether that information confirms what they already believe (i.e., confirmation bias) may 
fail to acknowledge, or even ignore information that opposes their viewpoint, regardless 
of the accuracy of that information. This can be potentially problematic for correcting 
biased beliefs about the cause of autism or the presumed safety of GMO consumption, 
both of which are somewhat polarized topics, and can ultimately interfere with one’s 
ability to make rational decisions (Robbins & Judge, 2007; Young, Tiedens, Jung, & 
Tsai, 2011).  
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Two Important Misconceptions: Vaccines and GMOs 
Two important misconceptions that are the focus of this dissertation are: (1) the 
false belief that vaccines cause autism and (2) the false belief that GMOs are hazardous 
for human consumption. Both of these specific false beliefs have potential impact for 
public health and the environment. Several of the factors discussed above are relevant to 
the misinformation surrounding vaccines and GMOs.   
The strong false belief that vaccines cause autism is pervasive, despite the fact 
that global public health communities strongly support vaccinations and many highly 
respected organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), American 
Medical Association (AMA), and American Pediatric Association (APA), explicitly 
communicate the message that “vaccines do not cause autism”. This community of anti-
vaxxers is vocal and there has been a decline in vaccination rates and, unfortunately there 
has been a rise of vaccine-preventable outbreaks such as measles and an even more recent 
polio-like illness, acute flaccid myelitis (AFM). AFM is a rare but seriously illness that 
specifically impacts children. This polio-like illness which has been linked to vaccination 
declines, impacts the nervous system especially the spinal cord, causes muscle weakness, 
and can lead to the sudden onset of paralysis (Messacar, Schreiner, Haren, Yang, Glaser, 
Tyler, & Dominguez, 2016). As recently as this month (February 2019), there are reports 
of vaccine-preventable outbreaks in places such as Washington state, which has identified 
36 confirmed cases of measles and 12 suspected cases still under examination (Wilson, 
2019). The failure of parents to vaccinate their children has dire consequences not only 
for children that are not receiving vaccines but also to the greater population. 
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Similar concerns can be seen in different contexts as well, such as in the case of 
human consumption of GMOs. Many individuals avoid the consumption of GMOs under 
the incorrect belief that GMOs are hazardous to human health. Not only has research 
found that GMOs are perfectly safe for human consumption, but it has also found 
numerous other benefits of GMOs, such as higher crop yields, and a longer-shelf life for 
fruits and vegetables. The reduction or stoppage of GMO production could have drastic 
global consequences such as fewer crops, higher use of pesticides, and more 
environmental food waste (Mannion & Morse, 2012). Despite scientific evidence 
supporting the use of GMOs, many individuals prefer organic, non-GMO ingredients in 
their diet and even encourage the removal of GMO products; an action that could have 
greater detrimental impact than they may realize. 
In this dissertation, I consider these common and particularly problematic false 
beliefs to examine the effectiveness of different misinformation correction approaches. 
There are numerous studies that have examined methods for addressing the false belief 
that vaccines cause autism (but only one study (Bode & Vraga, 2015) that I am aware of 
that addresses altering attitudes about GMOs). Wallis (2014) argues that simply telling 
people that there is plenty of scientific evidence that vaccines do not cause autism is 
unlikely to be effective, some have argued that this type of direct correction can produce 
a “backfire effect” – when individuals are presented with information that contradicts the 
beliefs one holds, their beliefs strengthen (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Indeed, a study by 
Nyhan and colleagues (2014) confirms this prediction. They used materials from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stating that vaccines do not cause 
autism as a misinformation correction approach to alter anti-vaxxer attitudes. Nyhan and 
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colleagues (2014) found that while the corrective information debunking the false belief 
“vaccines cause autism” reduced participant misconceptions about vaccines, it also 
resulted in a decrease in parent intention to vaccinate. Furthermore, corrective approaches 
that included images of children with measles, mumps, and rubella, as well as a narrative 
about a child who contracted measles “actually increased beliefs in serious vaccine side 
effects” (Nyhan et al., 2014, pp. 7). 
An Unlikely Pairing 
At first glance, vaccines and GMOs have very little in common. Vaccines are 
used to protect individuals from harmful illnesses to avoid contraction of preventable 
diseases, whereas GMOs are used by certain farmers to enhance their crops. Despite 
these surface differences, attitudes and beliefs about these contexts share some similar 
features. 
In both cases, there is a potential threat to the individual or family (because of the 
belief that there for potential health consequences to vaccination or consuming GMOs) 
and there is also a potential benefit to society (public health and/or environment) and to 
the self (protection from measles, for example). When anti-vaxxers choose not to 
vaccinate, they are primarily concerned about their own children. However, the 
community risk associated with the failure to vaccinate is often overlooked. Specifically, 
not vaccinating an individual child poses a direct threat to herd immunity – the notion 
that if most people are vaccinated then a disease is unlikely to spread even if some people 
are unable to be vaccinated for medical reasons (Anderson & May, 1985; Salmon et al., 
1999). Furthermore, the threat to the self for not vaccination is also ignored or minimized 
(e.g., by stating that measles or chickenpox are not dangerous, common childhood 
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infections). Similarly, when individuals choose to avoid GMOs under the belief that these 
foods are unfit for human consumption, it ultimately only impacts the individual. 
However, when those anti-GMO beliefs and attitudes are translated into behavior – such 
as in the case of GMO opposers to ban the use of those crop modifications – that this 
action can become problematic to the greater community. GMO plants typically lead to 
higher crop yields, are more resilient, and less susceptible to various threats (thereby 
reducing use of dangerous pesticides and herbicides). These factors impact the global 
environment (Nicolia, Manzo, Veronesi, & Rosellini, 2013; Mannion & Morse, 2012). 
One potential question to ask in addition to whether or not individuals will alter their 
attitudes surrounding these two heavily debated topics, is whether or not the potential 
negative impact on the community results in greater attitude change. 
Approaches to Correcting Misinformation 
Though misinformation correction has many aspects that make correcting 
individual misconceptions difficult, there are many misinformation correction approaches 
that show promise. As noted earlier, Johnson and Seifert (1994) proposed an effective 
misinformation correction approach in the form of a causal model alternative combat 
previously retracted or contradicted information. 
Another approach to successfully intervening may be to focus on specific 
individuals who are more likely to change their minds. Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann 
(2015) note that strength of pre-existing beliefs can account for the degree to which an 
individual alters their attitudes, beliefs, and intentions. In the case of anti-vaxxers, 
Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann argue that researchers should aim at altering the attitudes of 
“fence-sitters” – individuals who are neither anti-vaxxers nor vaccine supporters but 
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rather possess a neutral stance on the topic. In a reanalysis of one study that found some 
success in altering views of anti-vaxxers (Horne et al, 2015), Betsch, Korn, and 
Holtmann found their success was primarily due to belief change of fence-sitters. 
Other researchers argue that the key to successfully altering attitudes, beliefs, and 
even future behavior is through theory-based explanations of the initial misconception 
(Weisman & Markman, 2016). Weisman and Markman (2016) explored theory-based 
explanations in four different contexts: (1) hand-washing to prevent viral epidemics, (2) 
parental vaccination of their children to prevent a preventable disease outbreak, (3) 
completion of full antibiotic prescription to reduce antibiotic resistance, and (4) eating 
healthy foods to reduce unhealthy diets. Researchers noted that in every context, the most 
effective correction approaches provided participants with coherent explanatory 
frameworks to promote healthier behaviors. Given the promising results noted in the 
previously mentioned contexts, Weisman and Markman suggest this theory-based 
explanation approach is an effective correction intervention that researchers should apply 
in their studies. 
Harm Approach & Fear Appeals 
One tactic that has been used as an attempt to get individuals to engage in a 
certain behavior, such as vaccinating their children, is a fear appeal. Janis (1967) 
proposes that emotionally-arousing campaigns (“fear appeals” or “scare tactics”) tend to 
have an inverted U-shape in terms of their effectiveness. In other words, low-levels of 
emotional arousal do not have any effects on individual response to the topic at hand, 
while emotional arousal on the high-end will lead to resistance and defensiveness to 
“detach from the threat” – very similar to a backfire effect. Instead, the ideal fear appeal 
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has a moderate impact on emotional arousal. Not only does the level of emotional arousal 
influence the effectiveness of a fear appeal, but also how individuals evaluate the appeal 
message (Witte, 1992). As is common with other types of strong emotionally charged 
opposing intervention strategies, the results can sometimes lead to a backfire effect 
(Lennon, Rentfro, & O’Leary, 2010). 
Another potential approach to address misconceptions is to appeal to utilitarian 
views in the context of moral dilemmas (Marcus, 1980). In general, individuals select 
options that lead to harming the fewest number of individuals. However, the contexts of 
interest in this dissertation focus on dilemmas in which the potential harm/benefit is 
either to one’s own family, or to society at large (more people, but more distance). In the 
case of vaccines, parents face one of two choices: (1) have their children vaccinated to 
protect them from potentially life-threatening illnesses for themselves and others, or (2) 
fail to have their children vaccinated because they are concerned that their own child will 
develop autism. In the decision to avoid or consume GMOs, individuals are also 
presented with two choices: (1) consume GMOs with their environmental benefits, or (2) 
consume GMOs and face potential – though highly unlikely – health consequences. 
As noted previously, many studies have examined vaccine misinformation 
correction approaches (Horne et al., 2015; Nyhan & Reifler, 2014; Nyhan & Reifler 
2010). While this context has been studied, much less (or no) research has attempted to 
alter individual beliefs about GMOs . To my knowledge, there is only one study that 
examines individual attitudes toward GMOs and their safety (Bode & Vraga, 2015). Bode 
and Vraga (2015) conducted a study focusing primarily on the “intersection of 
misinformation and social media”; specifically, how social media influences both the 
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establishment of misinformation and their correction. While these researchers also 
examined false beliefs surrounding vaccines and autism and the safety of GMOs for 
consumption, due to the novelty of their exploration of GMO misinformation correction, 
I will focus on that particular facet of their study.  
In Bode and Vraga’s (2015) study of social media and misconceptions, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. Every condition 
contained information that supported the notion “GMOs make you sick”and included a 
Facebook NewsFeed story with two  related links supporting the false claim (one from a 
website that focuses on rumors and “urban legends” and one from the American Medical 
Association). After viewing the simulated Facebook NewsFeed and materials, 
participants were then assigned to a separate posttest matching the previously viewed 
issue. Attitudes toward GMOs and their safety was measured using three items: (1) 
“Genetically modified foods are safe to eat”, (2), “Genetically modified foods give you 
cancer”, and (3) “I try to avoid genetically modified foods”. Results suggested GMO 
attitude change is possible when individuals are exposed to corrective information found 
in social media. Aside from Bode and Vraga’s study, most research on beliefs about 
GMOs have studied, rather, why people are attracted to arguments in which claims are 
made about the negative health consequences of GMOs and, general public perception of 
GMOs (Beckwith et al., 2013; Blancke et al., 2015; Saletan, 2015; Maghari & Ardekani, 
2011). 
Beliefs and Attitudes 
Misinformation correction approaches tend to address beliefs (e.g., the belief that 
vaccines cause autism). However, addressing beliefs can also impact people’s attitudes 
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and behaviors. Wogalter and DeJoy (1999) define beliefs as thoughts and opinions about 
various topics and phenomena that are treated as true regardless of accuracy, and act as 
“building blocks” for attitudes. Beliefs generally refer to “an association between an 
entity and an attribute or outcome” (Hart, Albarracin, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, & 
Merrill, 2009). In the context of vaccines, the most prevalent false belief is that “vaccines 
cause autism”. The entity here being “vaccines” may lead to some undesirable outcome, 
in this case the development of autism. 
Attitudes on the other hand are “an individual’s evaluation of an entity (an issue, 
person, event, object, or behavior)” (Hart, Albarracin, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, & 
Merrill, 2009). Furthermore, Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann (2015) operationalize attitudes 
as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some 
degree of favor or disfavor”. For example, an individual who believes “vaccines cause 
autism” may also have negative attitudes about vaccines (e.g., vaccines are harmful). 
Using a vaccine example, an individual may believe that vaccines cause autism, therefore 
hold negative attitudes toward vaccines, and therefore decide to forgo vaccines. Prior 
research has suggested that misinformation correction approaches may need to consider 
both beliefs and attitudes in order to effectively correction misconceptions (Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2013; Betsch, Korn, & Holymann, 2015). In evaluating the effectiveness of the 
correction message in the studies in this dissertation, we include questions about people’s 
beliefs as well as their attitudes; because some assessment items (taken from prior 
studies) incorporate beliefs and attitudes, we consider these factors together. 
Furthermore, I test how addressing misconceptions about vaccines and GMOs affect 
people’s intended behaviors and other decisions.  
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Decisions 
 Ultimately, the goal of misinformation correction is to not only alter beliefs and 
attitudes, but also change decisions individuals might make. 
Decision-making is often framed in terms of expected utility. The expected utility 
of a particular decision (say, voting for an individual for president) is a sum of the weight 
of each potential consequence (signed as to whether it is positive or negative) multiplied 
by the likelihood of that consequence. To decide between two candidates, one would 
compare the expected utility of each candidate. The expected utility of any decision can 
be described by the formula below, in which x is a decision, p represents the probability 
of each outcome, and u represents the utility of that outcome: 
Σ[u(x)] = [p1*u1] + [p2*u2] + [p3*u3]… 
In the case of vaccinating one’s child or consuming GMOs, the expected utility 
might be described by the probability times utility of benefits (e.g., avoiding risk of 
measles) minus the probability times utility of risks (e.g., developing autism). In general, 
people prefer decisions decisions that maximize expected utility (Westen 1985; Westen, 
Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). Although many approaches to correcting 
misinformation focus on altering the incorrect negative risks (e.g., stating that there is no 
or miniscule probability that vaccines cause autism or that GMOs are unhealthy), an 
alternative might be to address the benefit side of the equation. In the case of vaccines, 
that would be avoiding the diseases that may be avoided by vaccination, and in the case 
of GMOs, it would be consideration of the environmental and food production 
consequences of GMOs. Indeed, that is the approach taken by Horne et al. (2015) in their 
study of vaccination attitudes. They compared a “autism correction” (direct correction) 
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intervention that claimed autism was not associated with vaccines to a “disease risk” 
intervention that focused on the negative consequences of the diseases avoided by 
vaccinating against measles, mumps, and rubella. Furthermore, Horne and colleagues 
(2015) found the newly generated “disease risk” approach to be effective at altering 
attitudes toward vaccines without causing a backfire effect (see Chapter 2). 
The Current Studies 
The goal of this dissertation is to assess whether the approach of focusing on the 
positive consequences of vaccination and consuming GMOs may be more effective than 
correcting misinformation regarding vaccines and GMOs. Specifically, I first examine 
whether the findings of Horne et al. (2015) are replicable. Then, I address one potential 
confound in their study to further understand the impact of their approach. Finally, I 
extend this approach to a new context, the consumption of GMOs. 
If the correction approach developed by Horne and colleagues (2015) can 
transcend contexts, the act of getting parents to vaccinate their children and humans to 
fearlessly consume GMOs may be positively impacted by increasing the estimates of the 
positive effects of receiving vaccines and GMOs rather than attempting to decrease 
estimates of the probability of the negative side effects. 
Despite the initial findings of the approach proposed by Horne et al (2015) that 
were promising, there are still several things that are unclear about their approach. The 
first concern about the proposed approach is the relatively small effect size based on the 
categorizations proposed by Leppink, O’Sullivan, and Winston (2016). Researchers 
initially found an effect size of d = .41, which suggests that while an effect of condition 
was found (the disease risk condition was more effective than a direct autism correction 
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condition and control) it is possible that these findings may not always replicate due to a 
lack of robustness. In addition to concerns about effect size, the vaccine scale developed 
by Horne and colleagues failed to parse vaccine attitudes, beliefs, and intentions into 
separate measurements, a concern raised by Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann (2015). This 
lack of subsets leads one to question if the proposed disease risk intervention really alters 
individual behavior. Although the scale proved to be highly reliable and correlated with 
individual past vaccine behaviors (see Chapter 3), the scale did not include a measure of 
participant agreement with the common misconception “vaccines cause autism”. The 
inclusion of clarity between scale items (e.g., measurements of beliefs, attitudes, 
intentions, etc.) could further justify what aspects of human cognition are impacted by 
these proposed interventions.       
Overview of Dissertation 
Although all the aforementioned can be potential contributing factors of 
correcting misinformation that can hinder the appropriate change in attitude in the 
presence of factual opposing information, they are not impossible to account for. The 
goal of the proposed set of studies was to examine various aspects of the expected utility 
formula applied to different topics (vaccines and autism, and GMOs) to investigate the 
degree to which individuals alter their attitudes and beliefs on these topics. More 
specifically, the current set of studies had three specific aims: (1) to evaluate the degree 
to which individuals alter their incorrect attitudes through a series of intervention studies, 
(2) to test whether the proposed intervention studies are effective across different 
domains, and (3) further examine the weight individuals place on anecdotal experiences 
compared to population statistics and facts by using the expected utility formula to weigh 
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both positive and negative probabilities and utility of partaking in certain behaviors. The 
current studies used specific topics that individuals – typically – have a polarized reaction 
to. The use of different contexts allowed us to fully examine the extent to which 
individuals alter their attitudes and beliefs based on the proposed interventions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Study 1: Direct Replication of Horne et al. (2015) 
  
  
Introduction 
  
In recent years there has been a significant increase in vaccine-preventable 
illnesses such as measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) (Althaus & Salathe, 2015; CDC, 
2015). This disturbing trend arises in part from a parent hesitation to vaccinate their 
children due to the mistaken belief that vaccines may cause autism (Pluviano, Watt, & 
Sala, 2017; Rao & Andrade, 2011). Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that vaccines do 
not cause autism, and there is no link between the two whatsoever (Taylor, Swerdfeger, 
& Eslick, 2014; Jain, Marshall, Buikema, Bancroft, Kelly, & Newschaffer, 2015; Kaye, 
del Mar Melero-Montes, & Jick, 2001). Thus, an important issue in public health is 
correcting false beliefs about the relationship between vaccines and autism with the hope 
that it will increase the likelihood that parents choose to vaccinate their children (Nyhan, 
Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014; Horne, Powell, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2015). 
Unfortunately, simply telling people that vaccines do not cause autism (autism 
correction) is not effective. Indeed, some studies have suggested that directly confronting 
false beliefs can even result in a backfire effect in which an individual’s original belief 
(regardless of accuracy) is strengthened in the presence of opposing information 
(Pluviano, Watt, & Sala, 2017; Masaryk & Hatokova, 2016; Peter & Koch, 2016). 
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In a recent paper, Horne et al. (2015) found a successful approach to changing 
attitudes towards vaccination. The decision to vaccinate, they note, involves computing 
an expected utility function of vaccination by weighing the relative risks (of putative side 
effects such as autism) and benefits (reducing risks of disease). Most public health 
approaches to changing attitudes towards vaccination focus on correcting misinformation 
directly (i.e., stating that vaccines do not cause autism). For example, the United States 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) takes this approach by clearly and 
explicitly stating on their website “Vaccines Do Not Cause Autism,” “There is no link 
between vaccines and autism,” and “Vaccine ingredients do not cause autism.” 
(https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html). Horne and colleagues, 
following Nyhan et al. (2014), chose to focus on the other component of the equation: the 
risk of diseases prevented by vaccination. Originally, Nyhan et al. created three versions 
of a disease risk intervention: (1) three different photos of children who had contracted 
measles, mumps, and rubella respectively, (2) an anecdotal story about a mother whose 
child contracted measles, and (3) a paragraph composed of three brief warnings about the 
importance of vaccination. Individually, these were not successful (Nyhan et al., 2014). 
However, Horne et al. combined these three elements to create a more comprehensive 
disease risk intervention. This “disease risk” intervention, as predicted, led to significant 
change in attitudes towards vaccination compared to a more traditional intervention that 
focused on an “autism correction” intervention.   
The Horne et al. (2015) study is important to replicate for several reasons. First, it 
has major public policy/health policy implications: countering misinformation that 
vaccine preventable diseases (i.e., mumps, measles, rubella) are no longer a threat to 
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people (which in actuality they still are for a variety of well understood reasons). The 
“correcting misinformation” condition of the Horne et al. (2015) study was not effective, 
yet it was modeled after current CDC practice. Second, the impact of their intervention 
was relatively small (Cohen’s d = .41), however, according to the meta-analytic effect 
size of social psychology expectancy effects (on average d = .16) their intervention was 
substantial (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003); replicating their findings before 
making policy recommendations is necessary. Third, future research aimed at 
understanding how to counter misinformation will benefit from confidence in the 
findings of the initial, groundbreaking Horne et al. (2015) study. Finally, there are 
inconsistencies in the correcting misinformation literature regarding the effectiveness of 
focusing on the risk of the diseases that vaccines prevent. While the Horne et al. (2015) 
study found a comprehensive disease risk intervention to be effective in changing 
attitudes, Nyhan et al. (2014)’s disease risk interventions did not successfully change 
people’s attitudes. While there have been other researchers who have examined similar 
constructs surrounding vaccines – such as Scherer et al. (2016) who studied the human 
papillomavirus (HPV) and vaccine adverse event reports (VAERS) to determine trust and 
concern about vaccine use and Witteman et al. (2015) who prompted participants to think 
about how values correspond to risk of obtaining a vaccine (which is similar to the 
disease risk condition proposed by Horne et al. (2015)) – the overall study and 
methodology proposed by Horne and colleagues (2015) is more applicable and 
appropriate to our proposed research question. Thus, we directly replicated the Horne et 
al. (2015) study in Study 1. 
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In Study 2, we addressed one potential alternative interpretation for the benefit of 
the disease risk intervention but not the autism correction intervention in the Horne et al. 
(2015) study. In the original study, the disease risk condition was much longer than the 
autism correction condition and included not only factual content about disease risk but 
also pictures and a narrative story. In contrast, the autism correction condition is a series 
of short factual claims that includes citations for participants to read if they chose to do 
so. This choice was made in the original study to reflect the approach used on the CDC 
website. Nonetheless, is not clear whether the disease risk condition is more effective 
than the autism correction condition due to these qualitative and quantitative differences, 
and we controlled for those factors in Study 2. 
Study 1 
To assess whether the comprehensive disease risk intervention effect (Horne et 
al., 2015) is replicable, we directly replicated their study using scripts (programmed in 
Qualtrics) provided by the research team. We recruited participants from approximately 
the same population (MTurk participants) with roughly the sample size of the original 
study, and data were analyzed in a similar fashion as the original study. 
Method 
         The current study was a direct replication of Horne et al. (2015). We followed the 
exact same methods as Horne and colleagues (2015). A direct replication with identical 
methods allows for better evaluation of both potential significant (comprehensive 
intervention) and null (individual intervention) results if the original findings are 
replicated. 
Participants 
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         All participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to 
ensure filtering out of participants that had previously participated in similar vaccine 
studies and the same inclusion criteria as Horne et al. (2015) was used (i.e., including 
native English speakers in the US, and participants who correctly answered all attention 
check items). Participants that failed to pass any attention check items were excluded 
from participating in the second study session available on the following day (see 
Procedure). Participants were provided with a consent form prior to completing any 
portion of the study. Following Horne et al. (2015), the study recruited participants in 
multiple sessions (session one and session two) (see Procedure). We made two power 
calculations using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) that focused on the 
results of two key analyses in the Horne et al. (2015) study. Horne et al. (2015) reported 
an effect size of Cohen’s d = .41 for change in the vaccine attitude change scores 
(posttest minus pretest) for the disease risk condition compared to the control condition 
(t(212) = 3.04, p = .003); because publication bias tends to lead to overestimations of 
effect sizes in the published literature, we chose a conservative assumed effect size d = 
.15, which is consistent with other studies of attitude change (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-
Zoota, 2003). The results of this analysis suggested that to achieve a power of .8 at the p 
= .01 level, we would require a minimum of 778 participants. The second power analysis 
was based on all three conditions (F(2, 312) = 5.287, p = .006 in Horne et al. (2015)). 
Using a more conservative effect size .15, this yielded a sample size of 924 participants 
to achieve a power = .8 and alpha of .01. Assuming an attrition rate of 25% between two 
sessions, we recruited 1000 participants to complete the first session of the study. 
Participants who passed the attention check items (see Procedure) were invited to 
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participate in the second session. Participants were paid $.75 for their participation during 
session one, and $1.35 if they returned for session two, for a total of $2.10. 
Vaccine Scale 
         The primary dependent variable in this study was the five-item vaccine attitude 
scale that was developed by Horne and colleagues (2015), as well as answers to the 
component questions. The vaccine scale was designed to assess individual general 
attitudes towards vaccines using a six-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” (see Appendix). Some of the items featured in the scale 
were reverse-coded. Examples of some of the response statements include “The risk of 
side effects outweighs any protective benefits of vaccines” and “I plan to vaccinate my 
children”. Additionally, researchers included a sixth item in their scale assessing vaccine 
attitudes “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”, however this question was 
not included in the original five-item vaccine attitude scale. This scale was taken at the 
end of the first study session, as well as at the end of the second study session. In the 
original study, to assess each participant’s change in attitudes toward vaccines, the first 
study session (pretest) was subtracted from the second study session (posttest) to yield a 
vaccine-attitude change score. We used this same approach but also analyzed the 
responses to the individual vaccine-related questions, including the sixth question as 
described below. As with the original study (Horne et al., 2015) we also assessed 
participant vaccine behaviors and family structure (i.e., “Have you had a flu shot in the 
last year”, “Are you a parent”, “Have you ever refused or elected to forgo a vaccine your 
doctor recommended for your children”) at the end of the second session. The inclusion 
of these behavioral questions further aids in assessing individual vaccine attitude change. 
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Procedure 
         As in Horne et al. (2015) the proposed study was administered over two sessions. 
During session one, participants were asked to provide some demographic information 
(age, sex, income, political preference, etc.) and to rate their level of agreement on a six-
point vaccine attitude scale in addition to rating their pre-existing beliefs on various 
morality scales including: euthanasia, abortion, and consequentialism (see Appendix). 
The morality scales were included to blind participants to the true purpose of the study. 
Attention check questions were randomly placed throughout these scales to ensure that 
participants are paying close attention to the questions. For example, one attention check 
stated, “We just want to make sure you are paying attention. Select ‘somewhat disagree’ 
from the options below to pass this attention check.” At the end of session one, 
participants that successfully answered the attention check questions were invited to 
return for session two. In the original study, the second session was released to MTurk at 
9am (PST) the following day and participants were instructed to complete session two 
between 9am-8pm (PST).  
         During session two of the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions (disease risk condition, autism correction condition, control condition) 
drawn directly from materials by Horne and colleagues (2015) (see Appendix A). These 
materials were originally derived from the CDC website and a previous study (Nyhan et 
al., 2014). Participants assigned to the disease risk condition were given three pieces of 
information: (1) a paragraph written from a mother’s perspective about her child who 
contracted measles, (2) pictures of children with measles, mumps, and rubella, and (3) 
three brief warnings about the importance of vaccinations; these three components were 
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presented in random order. Participants assigned to the autism correction condition read 
information stating that vaccines do no increase the risk of autism. Those participants 
assigned to the control condition read an unrelated scientific article used previously by 
Horne et al. (2015) and Nyhan et al. (2014).  
Results 
 Results were analyzed with SPSS 24. Following the data analysis from the 
original study (Horne et al., 2015), incomplete data were not used for data analysis. Our 
primary analyses were to repeat the key analyses in Horne et al. (2015). With very similar 
samples sizes (n = 364, Horne et al. (2015) n = 316), recruitment methods, and 
procedure, after conducting a one-way ANOVA to examine vaccine attitude change score 
by condition (disease risk, autism, control), results were significant and replicated the 
original study findings, F(2, 361) = 3.356, p = .036, η = .018 (see figure 2.1). When only 
examining the autism condition and control condition, there was a marginal effect of 
condition on vaccine attitude change score, t(243) = 1.776, p = .077, d = .23. In addition, 
when comparing the frequency of pretest vaccine attitude scores for the Horne et al. 
(2015) study (M = 4.84, SD = 1.05) with the current study (M = 4.95, SD = .96), there 
was no significant difference between pretest scores, t(643.99) = -1.450, p = .148, d = 
.11.  
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Figure 2.1. Vaccine attitude change score by condition. 
 
In addition, we also analyzed vaccine attitude change score by condition after 
parsing the original five item vaccine attitude scale (including hidden question six: 
“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”) into three subscales measuring: 
attitudes, beliefs, and intentions. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effect of condition on vaccine attitude (i.e., “The risk of side effects outweighs any 
protective benefits of vaccines”; “Vaccinating healthy children helps protect others by 
stopping the disease”; and “Doctors would not recommend vaccines if they were 
unsafe”) questions one, two, and five respectively. Results were nonsignificant, F(2, 361) 
= 2.176, p = .115, η2 = .012. A one-way ANOVA examined the effect of condition on 
vaccine intentions, question three (“I plan to vaccinate my children”) and found a 
marginal effect, F(2, 361) = 2.460, p = .087, η2 = .013, with the disease risk condition (M 
= .18, SD = .61), demonstrating the most change from pre to posttest for future vaccine 
intentions, compared to the autism correction condition (M = .13, SD = .57), and control 
(M = .02, SD = .62) (see figure 2.2). Independent sample t-test confirmed the disease risk 
condition was significantly better than the control, t(238) = 2.122, p = .035, d = .26. No 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Disease Risk Autism Correction Control
V
ac
ci
n
e 
A
tt
it
u
d
e 
C
h
an
ge
 S
co
re
   
 
44 
 
significant group differences were found when comparing the autism correction condition 
and control, t(243) = 1.481, p = .140. Additionally, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the impact of vaccine beliefs (i.e., “Children do not need vaccines for disease 
that are not common anymore”, “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”) 
question four and hidden question six respectively. Results were nonsignificant, F(2, 361) 
= 2.065, p = .128, η2 = .011. 
 
Figure 2.2. Average change score for vaccine question three examining intentions (“I 
plan to vaccinate my children”) by condition show the disease risk was the most effective 
at altering vaccine intentions. 
 
While the original tercile analysis was likely influenced by regression to the mean 
and the ceiling effect of the six-point scale, we still replicated that analysis to keep the 
replication analyses as similar as possible. We examined the effects of vaccine attitude 
change score based on condition and terciles generated from participant pretest scores, 
tercile cutoffs were identical to the ones Horne and colleagues (2015). A 3 X 3 factorial 
ANOVA was conducted examining tercile (bottom, middle, top) and condition (disease 
risk, autism, control) on vaccine attitude change scores. There was a significant main 
effect of condition, F(2, 355) = 3.177, p = .043, η = .018, a significant main effect of 
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pretest tercile, F(2, 355) = 28.625, p < .001, η = .139, but no significant interaction 
between the two, F(4, 355) = .644, p = .631, η = .007 (see figure 2.3). Though these 
results match the findings from the original study (except for the interaction results), it is 
important to note that this analysis does suffer from regression to the mean and its 
findings should be interpreted lightly.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Vaccine attitude change score by condition divided into terciles based on 
vaccine attitude pretest score. 
 
 To account for potential parental differences in vaccine perceptions, we will also 
conduct a 2 X 3 factorial ANOVA exploring parent status (parent vs. non-parent) and 
condition on vaccine attitude change score. A 2 X 3 factorial ANOVA was conducting 
examining parent status (parent (n = 203) vs. non-parent (n = 161)) and condition 
(disease risk, autism, control) on vaccine attitude change score. There was a significant 
main effect of condition, F(2, 358) = 3.256, p = .039, η2 = .018 (see figure 2.4). 
Specifically, the disease risk condition was marginally better than the control condition 
for both parents, t(130) = 1.814, p = .072, d = .32, as well as for non-parents, t(106) = 
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1.750, p = .083, d = .34. Results found no significant effect of parent status, F(1, 358) = 
.132, p = .717, η2 < .001, and no significant interaction, F(2, 358) = .032, p = .968 η2 < 
.001. 
 
Figure 2.4. Vaccine attitude change score by condition and parent status (parent or non-
parent). 
 
 An area of interest that may arise when discussing participants who have a choice 
to complete the second session of a study, may be whether there are pretest differences in 
individuals who were eligible to return and did not compared to those participants who 
were eligible and completed session two of the study. Results show there is no difference 
between those individuals eligible and return (n = 364) and those who failed to return (n 
= 489); F(1, 851) = 2.674, p = .102. 
 In addition to these replicated analyses, we also examined condition on vaccine 
scale question six (i.e., “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children.”). This is the 
main piece of misinformation surrounding the vaccine-autism debate, and we wanted to 
know how the correction interventions influenced attitudes on this statement. A one-way 
ANOVA found a significant difference between groups (disease risk: M = .135, SD = 
.700; autism: M = .419, SD = .817; control: M = .066, SD = .574) when examining 
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change score for question six, F(2, 361) = 8.666, p < .001, η = .046 (see figure 2.5). 
Specifically, an Independent samples t-test found a significant difference between the 
autism correction condition and control group, t(243) = 3.097, p < .001, d = .50. 
 
Figure 2.5. Average change score for vaccine hidden question six (“Some vaccines cause 
autism in healthy children”) by condition.  
 
Exploration of Individual Factors 
In addition to replicating the main analyses from Horne et al., we also conducted 
some exploratory analyses to examine individual differences that might provide some 
insight for future research in this area. Some research has suggested there are differences 
in individual beliefs, based on political party preference (partisanship), which could be 
potentially done through political motivated reasoning (Van Bavel & Periera, 2018). 
Political party preference – also referred to as partisanship – can influence many aspects 
of one’s life aside from whom they vote for, such as attitudes, behaviors, and decision-
making (Van Bavel & Periera, 2018). Previous research has found significant differences 
among partisanship and belief of scientific findings such as in the case of climate change 
(Van Bavel & Periera, 2018; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). 
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Using these findings, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine partisanship 
on pre-test vaccine scores (prior to receiving any intervention), results found a significant 
difference when looking at all six political categories (Republican (n = 85), Democrat (n 
= 139), Independent (n = 98), non-political (n = 17), moderate (n = 15), and libertarian (n 
= 8), (F(5, 344) = 4.524, p < .001, η2 = .06 (see figure 2.6). These results are still 
significant when only examining the three main political parties (Republican (M = 4.77, 
SD = .90), Democrat (M = 5.14, SD = .92), and Independent (M = 4.95, SD = .92)), F(2, 
313) = 4.434, p = .013, η2 = .03. Additionally, we also examined partisanship on vaccine 
attitude change score. Results were non-significant when taking into account all six 
parties, F(5, 356) = .687, p =.634, nor when only examining the three main political 
parties, F(2, 319) = .875, p = .418. 
 
Figure 2.6. Average pretest vaccine attitude score by political party preference. 
 
Additional exploration of Republican vaccine pretest attitudes found that while on 
average, Republicans are slightly pro-vaccine, a surprising 51.6% of Republicans score 
below the group average. However, only 5.8% of Republicans held actual anti-vaccine 
attitudes (score of less than or equal to three on a six-point scale) (posttest: 3.5% held 
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anti-vaccine attitudes), in comparison to 3.7% of Democrats (posttest: 2.9% held anti-
vaccine attitudes), and 3.7% of Independents (posttest: 2.9% held anti-vaccine attitudes).  
We were also curious about how partisanship might play an impact on hidden 
question six (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children.”). Interestingly enough, a 
one-way ANOVA found significant differences in attitude change score from pre- to 
posttest on hidden question six, F(2, 319) = 4.109, p = .017, η = .025 (see figure 2.7). 
Specifically, Republicans (M = .39, SD = .85), showed more change from pre to posttest 
than Democrats (M = .13, SD = .65), t(222) = 2.579, p = .011, d = .34. An Independent 
samples t-test also showed significant group differences between Republicans and 
Independents (M = .12, SD = .71), t(181) = 2.314, p = .022, d = .34. When examining 
partisanship in tandem with condition (disease risk, autism correction, control), on hidden 
question six change score, there is a significant main effect for partisanship, F(2, 313) = 
4.229, p = .015, η = .026; a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 313) = 7.929, p < 
.001, η = .048; but no significant interaction between the two, F(4, 313) = 1.255, p < 
.288, η = .016. A Tukey post hoc test revealed a significant difference between the autism 
correction and disease risk conditions, p = .003, as well as a significant difference 
between the autism correction condition and control group, p = .003. 
 
   
 
50 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Average change score for vaccine hidden question six (“Some vaccines cause 
autism in healthy children”) by the three main political party preference. 
 
Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to further assess if the results of Horne et al. 
(2015) were replicable, more specifically, if the disease risk condition was the most 
effective in terms of altering individual attitudes toward vaccines. A direct replication 
was conducted to further examine this phenomenon. The results of the pure replication 
study were consistent with previous findings. To summarize the findings, the disease risk 
condition was the most effective condition in terms of altering vaccine attitudes. 
However, when comparing only the autism condition with the control condition there was 
a marginal effect on attitude change score, implying that this condition for the given 
sample was slightly more impactful on altering attitudes than the original autism 
correction condition study sample. Interestingly enough, when analyzing the impact of 
condition on subscales (attitudes, beliefs, and intentions) of the vaccine attitude scale, 
results were not significant with the exception of a marginal effect on future intent to 
vaccinate one’s child. It could be the case that the proposed interventions are more 
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effective when discussing all aspects of vaccine misinformation in tandem. Parsing apart 
the vaccine attitude scale items in the manner that was conducted is similar to the work of 
Nyhan et al. (2014), which also found insignificant results. This could be one of the 
reasons why the items were analyzed together in later studies.  
Parent status had no significant impact on vaccine attitude change score. When 
examining hidden question six (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children.”), the 
autism condition was the most effective in changing attitudes on that question. These 
results further support the claim that altering anti-vaccine attitudes is most impacted 
when framing vaccine correction arguments in terms of disease risk (i.e., if one chooses 
not to vaccinate their child, then they are putting them at risk for contracting very serious, 
and sometimes life-threatening, diseases).  
The findings of our exploratory partisanship analyses further add to the literature 
on science skepticism and misinformation correction. While we found significant 
differences in partisanship as it relates to attitudes toward vaccines (Republicans were 
slightly more opposed to vaccines than Democrats or Independents), these results are not 
consistent with previous findings that conservatives (compared to liberals) were not more 
prone to vaccine opposition (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018; Kahan, 2015). Yet 
despite these pretest differences, Republicans also displayed more vaccine attitude 
change score on hidden question six (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy 
children.”); the main component of the misinformation surrounding vaccines. These 
results could also be explained by pretest scores; Republicans had the lowest vaccine 
attitude pretest scores, therefore they also had more room for attitude change from anti- 
to pro-vaccination. 
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These direct replication findings further support the idea that the way to alter anti-
vaccine attitudes is through framing of the costs associated with parental failure to 
vaccinate their children. However, Study 1a is not without its limitations. One potential 
reason that the disease risk condition was found to be effective could be due to the 
qualitative and quantitative differences noted between conditions (which was controlled 
for in Study 2).  
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Appendix 
Assessment Scales used for Studies 1 & 2 
For all scales, participants were asked to rate their agreement with each of these items on 
a six-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
 
Vaccination Scale (Horne et al., 2015) 
 
1. The risk of side effects outweighs any protective benefits of vaccines.  
2. Vaccinating healthy children helps protect others by stopping the spread of disease.  
3. I plan to vaccinate my children.  
4. Children do not need vaccines for diseases that are not common anymore.  
5. Doctors would not recommend vaccines if they were unsafe 
 
Distractor Scales (Horne et al., 2015) 
Abortion 
 
1. A pregnant woman has an obligation to bring her fetus to term.  
2. Abortion should be illegal.  
3. An unborn child’s right to life is more important than a pregnant woman’s right to 
make decisions about her body.  
4. A pregnant woman should always have the right to choose whether to continue her 
pregnancy.  
5. It is morally acceptable to terminate a pregnancy even if the mother’s life is not in 
danger. 
 
Consequentialism 
 
1. In life or death situations, one should take whatever means necessary to save the most 
lives  
2. Lying is always wrong  
3. The end result is the most important thing to consider when judging someone's actions  
4. It is never acceptable to harm someone, even if doing so would help many other 
people.  
5. People have an obligation to act in service of the greater good, even if that means 
hurting someone else. 
 
Euthanasia 
 
1. Terminally-ill people who are suffering should have the right to choose to die.  
2. People should not be allowed to kill themselves, even when they are in a lot of pain.  
3. Suffering at the end of life can be worse than death.  
4. Even if a patient wishes to die, doctors have an obligation to perform life-saving 
procedures.  
5. There are some contexts in which euthanasia should be legal. 
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Questions about Vaccines (Horne et al., 2015) 
 
Participants were also asked a series of questions about vaccines  
1. Have you had a flu shot in the last year?  
2. Do you expect to get a flu shot in the next year?  
3. Have any of your children had a flu shot in the last year?  
4. Do you expect that any of your children will get a flu shot in the next year?  
5. Have you ever refused or elected to forgo a vaccine your doctor recommended for your 
children?  
6. Does vaccinating your child (or not vaccinating your child) affect only your child or 
could it affect both your child and other people in your community? 
 
 
Original Autism Correction Condition (Horne et al., 2015) 
 
Please examine the following information about measles, mumps, and rubella 
carefully. 
 
All children should be vaccinated for measles, mumps, and rubella. The measles, mumps, 
and rubella vaccine (MMR) is safe and effective. 
 
Because signs of autism may appear around the same time children receive the MMR 
vaccine, some parents may worry that the vaccine causes autism. Vaccine safety experts, 
including experts at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the American Academy 
of Pediatrics, agree that MMR vaccine is not responsible for recent increases in the 
number of children with autism. A 2004 Institute of Medicine report concluded that there 
is no link between autism and MMR vaccine, and that there is no link between autism 
and vaccines that contain thimerosal as a preservative. 
 
Many scientific studies have found no link between MMR vaccine and autism. These 
studies include: 
 
1) A September 2008 study published in Public Library of Science was conducted to 
determine whether results from an earlier study claiming to find measles virus RNA in 
the intestinal tissue of autistic children could be confirmed. The results could not be 
confirmed, and no link between MMR and autism was found. 
 
2) A 2006 study published in the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders of 351 
children with autism and 31 typically developing children did not find a link between 
MMR vaccination and autism. 
 
3) A 2002 study by CDC in the New England Journal of Medicine followed more than 
500,000 children and found no association between MMR vaccination and autism.  
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Disease Risk Condition (Horne et al., 2015) 
 
Warning 
 
You or your child could catch these diseases by being around someone who has them. 
They spread from person to person through the air. 
 
Measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine can prevent these diseases. Most children 
who get their MMR shots will not get these diseases. Many more children would get 
them if we stopped vaccinating.  
 
Anecdote 
 
Here is a true story that shows why vaccination is so important. 
  
If you hear “106 degrees” you probably think “heat wave,” not a baby’s temperature. But 
for Megan Campbell’s 10-month-old son, a life-threatening bout of measles caused fevers 
spiking to 106 degrees and sent him to the hospital. “We spent 3 days in the hospital 
fearing we might lose our baby boy,” Campbell said. “He couldn't drink or eat, so he was 
on an IV, and for a while he seemed to be wasting away. When he could drink again, we 
got to take him home. But the doctors told us to expect the disease to continue to run its 
course, including high fever – which spiked as high as 106 degrees. We spent a week 
waking at all hours and soothing him with damp washcloths.” 
  
Thankfully, the baby recovered fully. 
  
Megan now knows that her son was exposed to measles when another mother brought her 
ill son into their pediatrician’s waiting room. 
 
Pictures 
 
All children should be vaccinated for measles, mumps, and rubella. These are serious 
diseases. Please read the descriptions of these diseases and carefully view the pictures.  
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Measles 
Measles virus causes rash, cough, runny nose, eye irritation, and fever. 
It can lead to ear infections, pneumonia, seizures (jerking and staring), brain damage, and 
death. 
 
Figure 2.A1. Illustration of a child with measles as presented to participants in the disease 
risk condition. 
 
Mumps 
Mumps virus causes fever, headache, and swollen glands. 
It can lead to deafness, meningitis (infection of the brain and spinal cord covering), 
painful swelling of the testicles or ovaries, and, rarely, death. 
 
 
Figure 2.A2. Illustration of a child with mumps as presented to participants in the disease 
risk condition. 
 
 
Rubella (German Measles) 
Rubella virus causes rash, mild fever, and arthritis (mostly in women). 
If a woman gets rubella while she is pregnant, she could have a miscarriage or her baby 
could be born with serious birth defects. 
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Figure 2.A3. Illustration of a child with rubella as presented to participants in the disease 
risk condition. 
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: Extended Replication of Horne et al. (2015) 
  
  
Introduction 
 
Study 2 addressed the quantitative and qualitative differences noted between the 
autism correction condition and disease risk condition in Study 1 as well as a 
combination condition (using both disease risk and a newly alternate autism correction 
approach). In Study 1 and Horne et al (2015), participants in the autism correction 
condition received a brief, direct misinformation correction intervention, while the 
disease risk condition was comprised of three components (i.e., anecdotal story, warning, 
pictorial evidence) and was significantly longer than the autism correction condition. 
Study 2 tested the effectiveness of a more thorough autism correction condition 
that included three components parallel to the three components from the disease risk 
condition. This new and more thorough alternate autism condition included a “warning” 
(in this case, acknowledging that autism is on the rise and vaccines are more prevalent, 
but that does not mean that the two factors are related), an anecdotal story (explaining 
where the misconception that autism causes vaccines came from), and visually-presented 
data about the lack of link between autism and vaccines (with 3 graphs, to correspond to 
the three photos in the disease risk condition) (see Appendix). This newly proposed 
comprehensive autism correction condition primarily focused on addressing the initial 
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reasoning behind why individuals may think that vaccines cause autism and further 
elaborate on correcting the misconception that vaccines do not cause autism. Together, 
these three features may be more effective than the original autism correction condition 
because each component addresses one of the features by which misinformation tends to 
be “sticky” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). By acknowledging 
individual concerns about vaccines and autism, it is possible that readers will be less 
likely to fall prey to “reactance,” which is a knee-jerk social response to being told what 
to believe (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Instead, individuals will have a more profound 
understanding as to why the vaccine-autism debate arose, and thus will be able to avoid 
reactance when discussing the issue of vaccines and autism. Providing a coherent 
explanation for why the misconception may have arisen also increases the likelihood that 
it can be corrected (Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Oberauer, & Morales, 2005; 2009; Weisman 
& Markman, 2016). Finally, repeated corrections in which multiple graphs of data are 
presented are also likely to increase the potential efficacy of correction (Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011). Furthermore, pictorially-presented data may be 
more effective at communicating data because it may be taken more seriously than when 
data are presented numerically or textually (Chua, Yates, & Shah, 2006). 
In addition to testing a more comprehensive alternate autism correction condition, 
the current study also tested a “combination condition” which is a combination of both 
the newly extended alternate autism correction condition as well as the original disease 
risk condition proposed by Horne et al. (2015). To further compare if the effects of both 
the extended alternate autism correction condition and the combination condition were 
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more or equally as effective as the original three conditions developed by Horne and 
colleagues, we looked at all five conditions together. 
We recruited participants from the same population (MTurk participants), using 
the same power analysis parameters noted in Study 1, and data were analyzed identically 
to the original study and Study 1. 
Method 
         Study 2 followed the same methods as Horne and colleagues (2015) as well as in 
Study 1 with the exception that the autism correction condition was closely matched in 
length and type of content to the disease risk condition, and a combination condition was 
included to test the impact of both a disease risk and more comprehensive alternate 
autism correction condition when presented together. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of five conditions (original disease risk, original autism correction, 
alternate autism correction, combination condition, original control). In addition, 
participants were given a four to 78-hour time frame to complete the second study 
session. 
Participants 
         All participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) using 
the same inclusion criteria as Horne et al. (2015) and Study 1. Participants were provided 
with a consent form prior to completing any portion of the study. Similar to Study 1, the 
proposed study also recruited participants in two study sessions (see Procedure). A total 
of 1939 participants were recruited to complete the first study session. Based on their 
responses to randomly placed attention check items, 1715 of the 1939 (88.4%) 
participants were invited back to complete session two. Of the 1715 participants, 656 
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returned to complete session two and successfully answered the attention check items 
(female: n = 328, male: n = 328; age: M = 38.02, SD = 12.78). This participant dropout 
rate was slightly higher than the dropout rates of Horne et al. (2015) (of the 720 
participants that qualified to complete session two, 315 returned and successfully 
completed all attention checks). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of pretest 
vaccine attitude scores for the original three conditions and all five conditions 
respectively, while figure 3.3 displays a comparison of percentage scores from Horne et 
al. (2015) and the current study. Pretest vaccine attitude scores did differ between 
participants who were eligible and completed session two of the study, (n = 656, M = 
4.86, SD = 1.02) and those eligible to complete session two that did not return, (n = 1059, 
M = 3.93, SD = .32), t(1713) = 27.67, p < .001. In addition to randomly placed attention 
checks, participants were asked if anything affected their participation negatively as well 
as how much effort was put into their responses. Of the 656 participants, six (.9% of 
participants) mentioned that something else negatively affected their participation. Five 
hundred and eighty-four individuals (89% of participants) reported “a lot of efforts in 
their responses, 68 participants (10.4% of participants) reported using “some effort”, 
three participants (.5% of participants) reported “very little effort”, and one participant 
(.2%) reported “no effort at all” in their responses. 
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Figure 3.1. Frequency of pretest vaccine attitude scores for the original three conditions.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Frequency of pretest vaccine attitude scores for all five conditions. 
 
Participants who failed to pass the attention check items and/or answer all 
questions were excluded from data analysis. Participants were paid $.75 for their 
participation during session one, and $1.35 if they returned for session two, for a total of 
$2.10. 
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Figure 3.3. Frequency of pretest vaccine attitude scores for Horne et al. (2015) in 
comparison to the current study using only the original three conditions (disease risk, 
autism correction, control). 
 
Vaccine Scale 
         The primary dependent variable in the current study was the five-item vaccine 
attitude scale that was developed by Horne and colleagues (2015). Additionally, 
researchers included a sixth item in their scale assessing the statement “Some vaccines 
cause autism in healthy children”, however this question was not included in the five-
item vaccine attitude scale. 
Procedure 
         The current study was identical to Study 1 with the exception that the autism 
correction condition was more thorough, and a combination condition was included to 
examine the effects of both disease risk and the extended alternate autism correction 
when presented together. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: 
the disease risk condition, autism correction condition, and control condition which were 
all derived from Study 1, Horne et al. (2015), and Nyhan et al. (2014), a new, extended 
alternate autism correction condition, and a combined condition which consisted of the 
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information from the original disease risk condition as well as the extended alternate 
autism correction condition.  
The new extended alternate autism correction group received three pieces of 
information presented in a randomized order: (1) a brief paragraph stating reasons why 
people may think vaccines cause autism, (2) information explaining the controversy 
surrounding Andrew Wakefield’s retracted “study” suggesting vaccines cause autism, 
and (3) graphical information from previous researchers displaying the lack of a link 
between vaccines and autism. Participants assigned to the combination condition were 
presented with six pieces of information (in a randomized order) compiled from the 
extended alternate autism correction condition and the original disease risk condition. 
The rationale behind a more thorough autism correction condition and combination 
condition, was to assess whether providing more information about the vaccine-autism 
controversy, together with a graphic representation of the evidence, would affect belief in 
the original autism-immunization claim.  
 Additionally, at the end of session one, participants that successfully answered the 
attention check items were invited to return for session two. Participants were instructed 
to complete session two of the study up to 78 hours after their completion of session one. 
The second session was released to MTurk four hours after the release of session one. 
Results 
Results were analyzed with SPSS 24. Similar to Study 1 and Horne et al. (2015), 
incomplete data was not included in data analysis. As in the original study and Study 1, 
we computed a vaccination attitude change score calculated as the difference between 
participants’ posttest and pretest vaccination attitude scores.  
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Overall Impact of Interventions 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted using only the original three conditions 
proposed by Horne et al (2015) as used in Study 1 to determine statistically significant 
differences between disease risk, autism correction, control on vaccine attitude change 
score. Results failed to replicate the original findings as well as the findings in Study 1, 
F(2, 397) = .517, p = .597. While in our Study 1 as well as Horne et al. (2015), results 
suggested the disease risk condition resulted in greater attitude change than the autism 
correction condition, and control, the current extended replication found no relative 
improvement with the correction (see figure 3.4). Comparing all five conditions 
(including the combination condition and the extended autism correction) vaccine attitude 
change scores did not differ, F(4, 651) = .740, p = .565, η2 = .005, (see figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.4. Vaccine attitude change score by the original three conditions (disease risk, 
autism correction, control). 
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Figure 3.5. Vaccine attitude change score by all five conditions. 
 
Tercile Analysis 
As in the original study and Study 1, analyses were conducted to determine 
whether the added information may have caused different effects based on pretest vaccine 
scores. The effects of condition were examined based on terciles generated from pretest 
vaccine attitude scores. Individuals with lower vaccine attitude scores (bottom tercile) 
would have the greatest potential to modify their attitude with the added information. A 3 
X 3 factorial ANOVA examining the original three conditions and tercile found no 
significant main effect of condition, F(2, 391) = .320, p = .726, η2 = .002, a main effect of 
tercile, F(2, 391) = 27.020, p < .001, η2 = .121, and no significant interaction, F(4, 391) = 
.151, p = .963, η2 = .002, (see figure 3.6). The same series of analyses were also 
conducted using all five conditions and yielded similar results. There was no significant 
main effect of condition, F(4, 641) = .985, p = .415, η2 = .006, a main effect of tercile, 
F(2, 641) = 47.221, p < .001, η2 = .128, and no significant interaction was observed, F(8, 
641) = .357, p = .943, η2 = .004, (see figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3.6. Vaccine attitude change scores across the original three conditions separated 
into pretest vaccine score terciles. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Vaccine attitude change score across all five conditions separated into pretest 
vaccine score terciles. 
 
“Fence-Sitters” Analysis 
 In a letter challenging Horne and colleagues’ (2015) tercile analysis boundaries, 
Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann (2015) argue that the bottom tercile is not representative of 
an anti-vaxxer – who when given the vaccine attitude scale used in the current study, 
would score on average below three on – but rather of the bottom tercile of that current 
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sample. We further examined this concern by conducting a “fence-sitters” analysis on the 
current data. For this analysis, individuals who scored below a three on the vaccine 
attitude scale were considered anti-vaxxers, those who scored a three were considered the 
“fence-sitters”, and individuals who scored above three were considered pro-vaccine (see 
table 3.1 and 3.2). 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive statistics for “fence-sitters” breakdown using original three conditions. 
 
   N  Percent     
Anti-vaxxers  22  5.5     
Fence-sitters  7  1.8   
Pro-vaccines  371  92.8  
 
Note. Anti-vaxxers = participants who scored in the bottom tercile, fence-sitters = 
participants who scored in the middle tercile, pro-vaccines = participants who scored in 
the top tercile. 
 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive statistics for “fence-sitters” breakdown using all five conditions. 
 
   N  Percent     
Anti-vaxxers  31  4.7     
Fence-sitters  13  2.0   
Pro-vaccines  612  93.3  
 
Note. Anti-vaxxers = participants who scored in the bottom tercile, fence-sitters = 
participants who scored in the middle tercile, pro-vaccines = participants who scored in 
the top tercile. 
 
 A 3 X 3 factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine the influence of vaccine 
attitude pretest terciles (as determine by Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann (2015)) and 
condition on vaccine attitude change scores. There was no main effect of condition, F(2, 
391) = .007, p = .993, no main effect of vaccine attitude pretest tercile, F(2, 391) = 1.516, 
p = .221, nor was there a significant interaction, F(4, 391) = 1.571, p = .181. When 
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conducting the same analysis using all five conditions, all results were non-significant, p 
> .15. 
Separation of Vaccine Scale Items 
In addition to analyzing the vaccine attitude scale in its entirety, we also analyzed 
vaccine attitude change score by condition after parsing the original five item vaccine 
attitude scale (including the originally omitted scale item: “Some vaccines cause autism 
in healthy children”) into individual categories (e.g., condition by vaccine intentions). By 
parsing vaccine scale items, we were able to further assess the degree to which 
individuals alter not only their attitudes towards vaccines, but also their future intentions. 
Additional analyses were also conducted on the main misconception about vaccines (i.e., 
“some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”) from the vaccine attitude scale.  
Attitudes & Beliefs towards Vaccines 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of condition on vaccine 
attitudes and beliefs (i.e., “The risk of side effects outweighs any protective benefits of 
vaccines”; “Vaccinating healthy children helps protect others by stopping the disease”; 
and “Doctors would not recommend vaccines if they were unsafe”) questions one, two, 
and five respectively. When examining only the original three conditions, omnibus 
ANOVA was nonsignificant, F(2, 397) = .099, p = .906, η2 < .001. There were also no 
significant differences between all five conditions and change scores, F(4, 651) = .329, p 
= .858, η2 = .002.  
Vaccine Intentions 
A one-way ANOVA examined the effect of condition on vaccine intentions, 
question three (“I plan to vaccinate my children”) for the original three conditions 
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(disease risk, autism correction, control) and all five conditions (original three including 
combination condition and extended autism correction). When examining the original 
three conditions, results were nonsignificant, F(2, 397) = 1.493, p = .226, η2 = .007. This 
pattern was also noted when examining all five conditions, F(4, 651) = 1.021, p = .396, 
η2 = .006.  
“Some Vaccines Cause Autism in Healthy Children” 
In the original Horne et al. (2015) study, a sixth question (“Some vaccines cause 
autism in healthy children”) was included in the vaccine attitude change scales but 
excluded from analyses. Here, we directly assessed the main piece of misinformation 
surrounding vaccines (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”) measure. When 
examining the original three conditions on hidden question six (“Some vaccines cause 
autism in healthy children”), results were nonsignificant, F(2, 397) = 1.367, p = .256.  
However, when taking into account all five conditions, vaccine attitude change score for 
hidden question six was significantly impacted, F(4, 651) = 2.494, p = .042, η2 = .015 
(see figure 3.8). Specifically, the newly created alternate autism correction condition (M 
= .54, SD = 1.01) demonstrated the most change pre to posttest, compared to the disease 
risk condition (M = .21, SD = .99), t(257) = 2.613, p = .009, d = .33. 
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Figure 3.8. Vaccine belief change score for the false belief “some vaccines cause autism 
in healthy children” across all five conditions. 
 
Parent Status 
A 2 X 3 factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of the original 
three conditions (disease risk, autism correction, control) and parent status (parents vs. 
nonparent) on vaccine attitude change score. All results were non-significant at the .05 
level (see table 3.3) with the exception of parent status on vaccine attitude change score 
(parents: M .24, SD = .60; non-parents: M = .15, SD = .52), which was marginal, F(2, 
394) = 2.867, p = .091, η2 = .007. We also conducted a factorial ANOVA comparing the 
effects of all five conditions and parent status on vaccine attitude change score. All 
effects were not statistically significant at the .05 level (see table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.3 
Factorial ANOVA results examining parent status on the original three vaccine 
conditions (disease risk, autism correction, control). 
 
   df   F    Sig. 
Condition   2  .680  .507 
Parent Status   1  2.867  .091 
Cond. X Parent  2  .891  .411 
 
Note. Cond. X Parent = interaction of condition by parent status. 
 
 
Table 3.4 
Factorial ANOVA results examining parent status on the original three vaccine 
conditions (disease risk, autism correction, control) with the additional two extended 
conditions (alternate autism correction, alternate autism correction/disease risk 
combination). 
 
   df   F    Sig. 
Condition   4  .799  .526 
Parent Status   1  2.603  .107 
Cond. X Parent  4  .757  .554 
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Note. Cond. X Parent = interaction of condition by parent status.  
 
To reconcile the original findings with this failure to replicate, we also examined 
participant pretest vaccine attitude scores from Horne et al. (2015) (M = 4.84) with the 
pretest vaccine attitude scores from the current study (M = 4.87). An Independent 
samples t-test revealed no significant difference, t(969) = .350, p = .727, d = .01. 
Compared to vaccination attitudes from 2015, participant attitudes have not drastically 
changed in the past couple of years. 
We also examined the validity of the vaccine scale by correlating past vaccine 
behaviors and intentions to vaccine. Within this original three conditions, among parents 
(n = 191), pretest vaccine attitude scores predicted whether parents had ever refused a 
vaccination recommended for their children (r = - .412, p < .001), as well as whether 
parents elected to have their children vaccinated for the flu in the past year (r = .358, p < 
.001). In addition, attitude scores also predicted whether participants themselves elected 
to receive the flu vaccine in the past year (r = .265, p < .001, n = 399). When examining 
the original three conditions with the inclusion of the two extended conditions, among 
parents (n = 308), pretest vaccine attitude scores predicted whether parents ever refused a 
vaccination recommended for their children (r = -.478, p < .001), as well as whether 
parents elected to have their children vaccinated for the flu in the past year (r = .232, p < 
.001, n = 655). Compared to the original vaccine scale results produced by Horne and 
colleagues (2015), these results are consistent with the original findings.  
Exploration of Individual Factors 
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Similar to the exploratory analyses of additional individual factors in Study 1, the 
current study wanted to further examine the potential impact political party preference 
(partisanship) has on vaccine related issues. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine partisanship on pre-test vaccine 
scores (prior to receiving any intervention), results found a significant difference when 
looking at all six political categories (see figure 3.10), F(5, 646) = 6.379, p < .001, η2 = 
.047. Specifically, Republicans significantly differed from Democrats, t(420) = 3.859, p < 
.001, d = .40, and Democrats significantly differed from Independents, t(324) = 3.964, p 
< .001, d = .64 (see figure 3.9). These results are still significant when only examining 
the three main political parties (Republican, Democrat, Independent), F(2, 565) = 7.548, 
p = .001, η2 = .026. Specifically, Republicans (M = 4.57, SD = 1.01), significantly 
differed in pretest vaccine scores compared to Democrats (M = 5.07, SD = .91), t(257) = -
3.867, p < .001, d = .52. 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Vaccine pretest scores separated by political party preference. 
 
 
Additional exploration of Republican vaccine pretest attitudes found that while on 
average, Republicans are slightly pro-vaccine, a surprising 44.4% of Republicans score 
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below the group average. However, only 7.1% of Republicans held actual anti-vaccine 
attitudes (score of less than or equal to three on a six-point scale) (posttest: 7.1% held 
anti-vaccine attitudes), in comparison to 4.1% of Democrats (posttest: 2.4% held anti-
vaccine attitudes), and 6.2% of Independents (posttest: 4.1% held anti-vaccine attitudes). 
We also examined partisanship on vaccine attitude change score. Results were non-
significant when taking into account all six parties, F(5, 646) = .929, p =.462, and when 
only examining the three main political parties, F(2, 565) = .517, p = .596. 
We were also curious about how partisanship (only for the three main 
partisanships) might play an impact the vaccine false belief “some vaccines cause autism 
in healthy children.”. Despite initial findings in Study 1, a one-way ANOVA did not find 
significant differences in attitude change score from pre- to posttest on the false belief 
that vaccines cause autism, F(2, 565) = .877, p = .417, η2 = .003. When examining 
partisanship in tandem with condition (disease risk, autism correction, control), on hidden 
question six change score, there is no main effect of partisanship, F(2, 338) = .276, p = 
.759, η2 = .002; no main effect of condition, F(2, 338) = 1.489, p = .227, η2 = .009; and 
no significant interaction between the two, F(4, 338) = .920, p = .453, η2 = .011. In 
addition, when examining these same constructs with all five conditions, results found, 
no main effect of partisanship, F(2, 553) = 1.121, p = .327, η2 = .004; a marginal effect of 
condition, F(4, 553) = 2.260, p = .062, η2 = .016; with the newly extended alternate 
autism correction condition (M = .55, SD = 1.02) and disease risk condition (M = .21, SD 
= 1.00) differing significantly, t(221) = 2.460, p = .015, d = .34 (see figure 3.10). There 
was no significant interaction, F(8, 535) = .727, p = .667, η2 = .010. 
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Figure 3.10. Vaccine attitude change score separated by political party preference and 
condition. 
 
Discussion 
 In the current study, we examined an extended replication of Horne et al. (2015). 
When only examining the original three conditions (disease risk, autism correction, 
control), results failed to replicate previous findings, including the results noted in Study 
1; there was no improvement in vaccine attitude change score regardless of condition. 
These findings persisted when comparing all five conditions. 
Though the current study failed to replicate previous findings (Horne et al., 2015), 
there were promising results in other areas. Specifically, the newly extended autism 
correction condition was effective on the main false belief surrounding vaccines (“Some 
vaccines cause autism in healthy children”). These results are similar to findings 
presented in Study 1which showed the autism correction condition was also the most 
effect of the original three conditions on this vaccine misconception. It is possible that the 
alternate autism correction effectiveness was the result of message length and 
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comprehensiveness (mirroring the disease risk condition) which was not altered in the 
original study or Study 1.  
When considering why the main findings failed to replicate, one must also 
consider the participants themselves. The outcome of the current study could have been 
impacted by anti-vaxxers. It could be the case that the individuals who could have 
received the most benefit from the misinformation correction interventions failed to 
return for study session two despite qualifying for it. One potential explanation for these 
findings could be because these individuals are highly motivated believers that actively 
avoid discussing issues regarding vaccine (Epley & Gilovich, 2016). Nonetheless, we 
must consider that these results might have differed if more anti-vaxxers returned for 
study session two, or if the study were deduced to one session.  
Another notable difference between the current study and Horne et al (2015) is 
the time allotment between session one and session two. Horne and colleagues had 
participants return to complete session two of the study the following day from the hours 
of 9am-8pm PST. The current study allowed individual a four to 78-hour time frame to 
complete the study. This extended window of time could account for heavy attrition rates 
noted in the current study. While this factor is not suspected to be very influential in the 
failure to replicate, it was noted as a difference between studies. 
In addition, Study 2 also showed that when examining individual differences 
(specifically partisanship) on vaccine attitude change supported the initial findings from 
Study 1. When examining the three main political parties – in terms of sample size for 
this study – Republicans had the lowest baseline average surrounding vaccine attitudes 
compared to Democrats and Independents. When further exploring partisanship and 
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vaccine attitudes, despite the findings noted in Study 1, there were no significant 
differences in vaccine attitude change score from pre- to posttest on the misinformation 
statement “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”. Additionally, the “fence-
sitters” vaccine attitude pretest tercile analysis failed to show any significant findings. 
These results fail to support the findings by Betsch, Korn, and Holtmann (2015) which 
suggest more effective attitude alteration when misinformation correction approaches 
target larger groups of individuals with neutral vaccine attitudes rather than anti-vaxxers.   
 While this study failed to replicate previous findings, it does add to the debate of 
how exactly individuals should correct for misinformation, specifically misinformation 
about vaccines. Given that Study 1 was able to directly replicate the findings from Horne 
et al. (2015), we were optimistic about the outcome of the current study. However, given 
the contradictory findings presented throughout the misinformation correction literature, 
these results were not entirely surprising. While these results failed to replicate, they 
were, however, consistent with previous findings in which interventions fail to increase 
future intent to vaccinate (Nyhan et al., 2014).  
Another potential reason for the differences in results from Study 1 to the current 
study could be due to the relatively small effect size the disease risk correction has (as 
observed in Horne et al (2015)). Perhaps, the nature of the effect size influences the 
ability to have robust findings therefore negatively influencing study replicability. One 
approach researchers could use to adjust this issue could be to re-develop the disease risk 
approach to include a plausible causal alternative to correct misinformation, as 
demonstrated in Johnson and Seifert (1994). A potential causal vaccine condition could 
include information about Andrew Wakefield and his fraudulent study which sparked the 
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anti-vaxxer movement. While components of a causal model were included in the 
alternate autism correction condition, future studies should assess the causal aspect in 
isolation as a condition compared to the disease risk condition. This comparison will 
allow for further assessment of the effectiveness of different misinformation correction 
approaches. Though the findings of the current study, along with the findings in Study 1, 
do not offer an undisputed misinformation correction strategy for altering individual 
attitudes toward vaccines, it does provide a starting point for researchers and policy 
makers alike. 
 While the disease risk condition was not as effective in the current study as it was 
previously in Study 1a and in Horne and colleagues 2015 study, the newly extended 
autism correction condition was highly effective at altering vaccine attitudes on the 
misconception that “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”. Additionally, the 
findings demonstrated that a combined disease risk – extended autism correction 
condition may be effective at altering vaccine attitudes. Furthermore, future studies 
would benefit from examining a combination correction condition which allows for a 
direct correction of misinformation while also highlighting potential harmful aspects of 
not obtaining vaccines. 
  One important aspect to note about this study is the extensive examination of the 
vaccine scale parsed into different items, specifically examining the vaccine false belief 
“some vaccines cause autism in healthy children” intentions. While these data failed to 
replicate the main findings of Horne et al (2015) (i.e., the disease condition was the most 
effective at altering vaccine attitudes), it also demonstrated some interesting findings. 
Specifically, these results suggest that a direct misinformation correction approach as 
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seen in the autism correction condition may be a more influential approach to use when 
looking at vaccine beliefs. The main misconception about vaccines – “Some vaccine 
cause autism in healthy children” – was mostly impacted by the autism correction 
condition. When considering these results, one must also consider the possibility that 
these findings are the outcome of a correction approach that presents information counter 
to the belief in question. In addition, one must also entertain the possibility of a backfire 
effect as noted by Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2014), however these results do not support 
that effect. 
 These interesting findings propelled us to explore this topic more but within 
different contexts. Specifically, we wanted to further test the misinformation correction 
approach in a context examining misconceptions about the safety of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) for human consumption. This GMO context allowed us to draw 
theoretical connections to vaccines such as the individual and environmental/societal 
impact of whether one engages in a certain behavior. In addition, the results of the current 
study further demonstrated that attitudes and intentions will not always be influenced in 
the same manner by the same correction approach. In the proposed study of this “disease 
risk” misinformation correction approach using a GMO context, we generated a series of 
different scales assessing attitudes and intentions, as well as implications toward GMOs. 
This development of subscales will also allow us to further explore how individual 
differences require different misinformation correction approaches.  
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Appendix 
Newly Constructed Comprehensive Autism Correction Condition 
 
Introduction 
 
Please examine the following information about measles, mumps, and rubella 
carefully. 
 
Introduction 
  
You might worry that childhood vaccines can cause autism, but research has actually 
found that being vaccinated is in no way connected to developing autism. 
  
There are several reasons that some people think vaccines cause autism. First, children 
are more likely to be vaccinated today, and autism is also more prevalent. However, this 
is likely a coincidence and the increased prevalence in autism is due to increased 
awareness. Second, children are often diagnosed around the same age that they are 
vaccinated; this is probably because parents and doctors notice autism symptoms when 
children are supposed to be learning language. 
 
Anecdote 
 
True Story 
  
In 1998, Dr. Andrew Wakefield published an alarming study linking autism to the 
vaccine that prevents measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR). Wakefield—who has no 
formal pediatric qualifications—“found” in his uncontrolled study of only 12 
children that the three vaccines taken together could “alter immune systems, causing 
intestinal woes that then reach, and damage, the brain.” His findings, of which he 
offered no causal mechanism, were later debunked and rejected, The British Medical 
Journal called his work “fraudulent”. In addition, the British journal Lancet retracted 
Wakefield’s originally published works and had his medical license stripped due 
to ethical violations and scientific misconduct. 
 
 
Following Wakefield's initial study, numerous large-scale scientific studies have 
concluded that there is no relationship between vaccines and autism. These studies have 
been conducted by scientists from around the world. A recent meta-analysis combined 
the results of these studies that together included over 1,266,327 children found 
absolutely no relationship between vaccination and autism, the MMR vaccine and autism, 
or thimerosal and autism (Taylor, Swerdfeger, & Eslick, 2014). 
 
Research 
 
Research 
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Vaccinating your children has been found to have no influence on the development of 
autism. Please look over the following graphs displaying the truth behind vaccinations. 
 
Jain et al. (2015) 
This graph shows that in a large sample of children with older siblings, getting the 
measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine was not associated with increased risk of 
autism. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.A1. Illustration of the research by Jain et al. (2015) presented to participants in 
the newly extended autism correction condition. 
 
Kaye (2001) 
This graph shows that while autism risk rates have gone up over the years, measles, 
mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccines have stayed constant.  
 
 
Figure 3.A2. Illustration of the research by Kaye (2001) presented to participants in the 
newly extended autism correction condition. 
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Taylor, Swerdfeger, & Eslick (2014) 
These two charts demonstrate the results of a meta-analysis examining two different 
types of observational studies: risk-factor studies and disease outcome studies. Results 
found that there is no evidence of a relationship between vaccinations and autism 
spectrum disorders.  
 
 
Figure 3.A3. Illustration of the research presented to participants in the newly extended 
autism correction condition. 
 
Control (Horne et al., 2015) 
 
Please examine the following information about bird feeding carefully. 
 
Q: What are the costs and benefits of bird feeding? 
 
A: It is difficult to assess the costs and benefits of bird feeding because it is difficult to 
compare the health of birds without access to feeders with birds that frequent feeders. 
Only one study was able to obtain some sound results. That study found that any benefits 
of feeding only appear to occur sporadically under extreme climactic conditions. No 
research has been able to demonstrate a cost. Aside from costs and benefits to birds, there 
is a cost and benefit to humanity. The costs are obvious – the expense of bird feeding 
supplies. 
 
The benefits include learning more about birds and the joy of connecting with the natural 
world. Bird feeding provides a direct, intimate view of the natural world for more than 50 
million Americans who feed the birds in their yards. It is most popular in winter, when 
birds seem to need the most help. Some people worry that birds will suffer unless they 
make great efforts to the feeder filled, but research indicates that most birds do not 
depend on feeders.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Study 3: Genetically Modified Organisms 
  
  
Introduction 
  
According to the Center for Food Safety (2018), genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) account for 92% of United States grown corn, 94% of soybeans and cotton. 
Furthermore, 75% of supermarket stocked shelf items contain some sort of GMOs. 
Despite the prevalence of GMOs in US food, many individuals and groups (including the 
Center for Food Safety) oppose the use of GMOs because they believe that GMOs are 
hazardous to human health (Mannion & Morse, 2012). On the contrary, other 
organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), American Medical 
Association (AMA), National Academy of Sciences, and the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science all agree that there is no reasonable evidence to support that 
GMOs are harmful to human consumption (Saletan & Union, 2015). Because this issue is 
heavily debated, some researchers have stated there is “no scientific consensus on the 
safety of GMOs” (Hilbeck et al., 2015). However, most researchers have found GMOs to 
not only be safe for human consumption but also beneficial for the environment (Nicolia, 
Manzo, Veronesi, & Rosellini, 2013; Mannion & Morse, 2012). Specifically, GMOs 
presented in food are said to improve food production, food quality and safety, all while 
positively influencing social and economic growth (Qaim & Kouser, 2013).  
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Previous studies of GMOs have typically had one goal in mind: understanding 
public perceptions of GMOs. This goal has resulted in several typical study designs in the 
GMO literature such as: (1) the use of focus groups to gather more information about the 
public knowledge of biotechnology, (2) the use of a series of questionnaires designed to 
access individual knowledge and level of acceptance of GMOs, and (3) the use of a 
combination of both focus groups and surveys (Sorgo & Ambrozic-Dolinsk, 2009; Chen 
& Raffan, 1999; Lewis & Leach, 2007; Silk, Parrott, & Dillow, 2009). Typically, the 
questionnaires noted above, are used to access individual attitudes and level of 
acceptance toward GMOs. Some of the examples of attitude assessments included in 
those questionnaires include: “All mutations are harmful”, “Bread rising is a biotechnical 
process”, and “Products from GMOs (genetically modified organisms) must be labeled as 
containing GM components” (Sorgo & Ambrozic-Dolinsk, 2009). 
Studies have suggested that anti-GMO attitudes may be rooted in heuristic 
thinking (Blancke et al., 2015). Specifically, individuals view plant and crop modification 
and introduction of new plant organisms as an “unnatural”, contaminated, or unhealthy 
process (Blancke et al., 2015) and therefore reject them. Initial emotional reactivity and 
an individual’s level of knowledge about GMOs can also influence whether an individual 
holds negative perceptions about GMOs. 
One factor that seems to impact individuals’ feelings toward GMOs is that it is 
difficult to actually avoid them. Because of weather conditions, insect life, proximity to 
other farms, and cross-pollination, it is possible one may be unknowingly consuming 
GMOs that have contaminated non-GMO farms (Silk, Parrott, & Dillow, 2009; Myhr & 
Traavik, 2001). Meat eaters who are opposed to GMOs are concerned that they may be 
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eating meat from animals who have previously consumed foods made with GMOs. This 
lack of one’s ability to control consumptions seems to add to people’s fears. 
The prior research focuses on attitudes toward GMOs rather than addressing or 
altering these attitudes. So, what can be done to effectively alter attitudes about GMOs? 
A Novel Study 
Currently, there is only one study in the literature that I am aware of that focuses 
specifically on altering GMO attitudes (i.e., Bode & Vraga, 2015). Instead, most studies 
examine public knowledge – or lack thereof – about the safety of human consumptions of 
GMOs, in addition to assessing individual perceptions of GMOs, while examining the 
origin of those beliefs. Given that the one study that has examined altering GMO 
attitudes specifically focused on the role of social media in misinformation correction, we 
designed misinformation correction approaches – paralleled after the interventions used 
in the vaccine correction literature – to examine the degree to which we can alter negative 
GMO attitudes and beliefs while improving future intentions of using GMOs.  
Expected Utility of GMOs 
The current study used a cognitive approach to examine the impact different 
GMO misinformation correction interventions had on individual attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors/intentions surrounding GMOs. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, the current study 
used a series of intervention strategies that highlighted various aspects of the expected 
utility formula to further examine potentially altered attitudes and beliefs toward GMO 
concerns. Emphasizing the beneficial societal and environmental properties of GMOs 
while discussing the research on the harmlessness of GMOs for human consumption, is 
analogous to the strategic approach the extended alternate autism correction condition 
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used in Study 2. This approach allows for further comparison of the effectiveness of 
similar intervention tactics in different domains. 
Here, we applied an expected utility formula for GMOs (as applied to vaccines by 
Horne and colleagues, 2015): 
Σ[U(GMOs)] = [P(positive consequences)U(positive consequences)] + 
[P(negative consequences)U(negative consequences)]. 
While individuals seem to be aware of the vaccine debate, people have less 
knowledge about the positive and negative consequences of GMOs aside from a general 
fear of the “unnatural” plus the knowledge that more expensive and organic foods are 
often labeled as non-GMO and that therefore there may be negative consequences of 
consuming GMOs. Even a tiny risk without knowledge of a benefit yields a negative 
utility function. In that case, it may be possible that a misinformation correction approach 
that addresses the potential risks – or lack thereof (GMO correction condition) – may not 
be effective. 
An alternate approach, akin to the disease risk approach proposed by Horne et al. 
(2015), would be to highlight either the negative consequences of not having GMOs or 
the positive environmental and societal impact of GMOs. In other words, this can easily 
be converted into an expected utility formula to assess the potential risks and outcomes 
associated with GMOs: 
Σ[U(GMOs)] = [P(negative consequences if no GMOs exist)U(negative 
consequences if no GMOs exist)] + [P(negative health consequences)U(negative 
health consequences)]. 
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When applying a similar expected utility formula to GMOs as was used prior for 
vaccines, there are essentially two expected utility and decision-making outcomes one 
must consider: (1) the impact of the use and consumption of GMOs at the individual 
level, and (2) the influence of GMO usage on the environment and society. The 
misinformation correction approaches proposed in this study address these concerns in 
more depth. The interventions proposed were similar to intervention tactics used in 
Studies 1 and 2 (see Procedure). 
The misinformation correction condition addressing the beneficial aspects of 
GMOs (GMO Explanation condition) parallels the disease risk condition from Horne et 
al. (2015), as well as Studies 1 and 2. This GMO explanation condition specifically 
focused on the environmental and societal benefits of GMOs (e.g., higher crop yield, 
more resilient plants, increase in global food production). Additionally, the GMO 
correction condition paralleled the extended alternate autism correction condition 
developed for Study 2. The GMO correction condition used scientific research and 
evidence to highlight the safety of human consumption of GMOs. Addressing the 
benefits GMOs provide at the societal and environmental level rather than solely focusing 
on how GMOs impact the individual, allowed us to further extend upon the previous 
studies (Study 1 and 2). Specifically, the proposed study examined the effectiveness of 
different misinformation correction approaches on altering individual attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors/intentions as well as implications toward GMOs.  
Method 
         The current study compared how different messages impact participant attitudes 
toward GMOs. Participant inclusion and exclusion criteria and statistical analyses were 
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similar to the previously described methodology in Studies 1 and 2. One noticeable 
difference in methodology between the current study and the previously mentioned 
studies, was that the entire study was completed in a single session. We selected this 
approach as an initial test due to levels of attrition noted in the previous studies and the 
relative lack of robustness of the earlier previous findings. 
Participants 
         Similar to Studies 1 and 2, all participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (i.e., including native English speakers in the US, and 
participants who correctly answered all attention check items). Participants were 
provided with a consent form prior to completing any portion of the study. An initial pilot 
study (Study 3a) was conducted prior to the full collection of data noted in Study 3b. 
Using the initial findings for Study 3a, a power calculation was conducted using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), detecting effect sizes of d = .25 or 
greater. After correcting for multiple comparisons, 1000 participants were needed to 
complete Study 3b (n = 692). Participants were paid $1.35 for their participation. 
GMO Scales 
         The primary measure of attitude change for GMOs was a series of self-generated 
GMO items comprised of several subscales. These self-generated scales assessed specific 
stances individuals may have about GMOs (e.g., beliefs and attitudes about the safety of 
GMOs, beliefs and attitudes about the environmental influence of GMOs, and 
behaviors/intentions toward GMOs.  All newly generated GMO scales consisted of six-
point items ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. The GMO 
behaviors/intentions scale assessed items such as “I would be willing to pay more to 
   
 
94 
 
avoid consuming genetically modified organisms” (seven items: α = .94). The attitudes 
and beliefs about GMO safety subscale contained items such as “Genetic modification of 
food products is unnatural” (three items: α = .89). Given that the proposed 
misinformation correction interventions discuss the environmental aspect of GMOs, 
participants were asked about their attitudes about the environmental impact of GMOs 
(e.g., “Genetically modified organisms are beneficial to the environment”) (three items: α 
= .76). In addition to validity tests, all GMO scales were piloted in a small sample study 
(see Study 3a Findings).  
While the generation of an entirely new scale can bring about a host of reliability 
and other statistical concerns, currently, only one scale in the literature exists that allows 
for the examination of the alteration in individual attitudes (e.g., Bode & Vraga, 2015) 
but this only exists in the context of how influential social media can be and only assesses 
attitudes toward GMOs. Currently published scales on GMO attitudes merely assess 
individual beliefs surrounding the nature of the given topic, however, we are primarily 
interested in the correction of misinformation that allows for the altering of attitudes and 
beliefs and for further examination of effect misinformation correction intervention 
approaches. Additionally, all self-generated scales had a reliability of α >.75. The 
proposed scales (see Appendix) measure individual attitudes and beliefs toward GMOs 
using similar approaches from previous studies (Linnhoff, Martin, & Smith, 2017) while 
accounting for potential attitude and belief changes. Many of the items featured in the 
scales were reverse-coded. This scale was administered once at the beginning of the study 
session and again after condition randomization, at the end of the study. 
Procedure 
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         Study 3 followed the same general procedure seen in Studies 1 and 2. A 
noticeable difference between the current study and the previous two studies is the 
session administration time. Given previous attrition rates associated with administering 
multiple-session studies via MTurk and the results of the pilot studies, Study 3 was 
administered in one study session. Another difference in procedure between Studies 1 
and 2 and the current study was the primary dependent measure. Study 1 and 2 used one 
overall vaccine attitude scale that had to be parsed into subscales to further assess 
individual changes in views towards vaccines. For the current study, we generated a 
series of GMO scales assessing: behaviors/intentions toward GMOs, attitudes and beliefs 
about the safety of GMOs, and attitudes and beliefs about the environmental impact of 
GMOs. Additionally, all items were examined under one overarching GMO scale in a 
series of exploratory analyses (see Results). 
 Participants were asked to provide demographic information (age, sex, income, 
political preference, etc.), rate the frequency in which they engage in certain shopping 
behaviors (e.g., “I buy food made with genetically modified organisms”), and to rate the 
level of agreement on three different six-point GMO scales in addition to rating their pre-
existing beliefs on various morality scales including: euthanasia, abortion, and 
consequentialism (see Appendix). Attention checks were randomly placed throughout 
these scales to ensure participants were paying close attention to the questions. An 
example of an attention check question was as follows: “For this statement, please select 
agree”. Participant responses that failed to pass all attention checks were excluded from 
data analysis.  
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 After completing a series of behavior/intentions, and attitudes and beliefs 
questionnaires, participants were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) 
GMO correction condition modeled after the extended alternate autism correction 
condition introduced in Study 2, (2) GMO explanation condition (modeled after the 
disease risk correction condition proposed by Horne et al. (2015) and used in Studies 1 
and 2, (3) the same control condition used by Horne and colleagues (2015) and as seen in 
Studies 1 and 2. Participants assigned to the GMO correction condition were given three 
pieces of information: (1) a brief paragraph that highlights the research organizations that 
argue GMOs are safe for human consumption, (2) a fictious anecdotal story about a new 
parent who only buys organic non-GMO food despite scientific findings, and (3) 
graphical information from previous researchers highlighting the safety of human 
consumption of GMOs. Similar to the GMO correction condition, the GMO explanation 
condition also consisted of three pieces of information: (1) a brief paragraph about the 
safety of GMOs for human consumption, (2) a story about a fictious woman who is 
concerned about food safety despite the many benefits of GMOs, and (3) graphical 
information from previous researchers displaying the benefits of GMOs for the 
environment and society at large. Participants assigned to the control condition read an 
unrelated scientific article used previously by Horne et al. (2015) and Nyhan et al. 
(2014).  
Study 3a Findings 
A GMO pilot study (Study 3a) was conducted to test the effectiveness of GMO 
misinformation correction approaches on altering attitudes and beliefs, and 
behaviors/intentions toward GMOs. Results were analyzed using SPSS 25. Incomplete 
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data were not included in data analysis nor were participant responses that failed to pass 
attention checks. One-hundred fifty participants were recruited to complete the pilot. 
After accounting for exclusions, 116 participant responses were analyzed. 
GMO Behavior/Intentions & Attitudes and Beliefs about Safety of GMOs 
 
A one-way ANOVA examining condition on behavior/intentions toward GMOs 
change score found significant results, F(2, 113) = 4.442,  p = .014, η2 = .07, with the 
most effective condition being the GMO explanation intervention. Specifically, the GMO 
explanation condition significantly differed from the control, t(78) = 2.994, p = .004, d = 
.67 (see figure 4.1). Additionally, the GMO explanation condition significantly differed 
from the GMO correction condition, t(75) = -2.110, p = .038, d = .46. The findings 
testing the impact of condition on GMO attitude change score (F(2, 113) = 1.346, p = 
.264), failed to meet significance (see table 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. GMO behavior/intentions change score by condition. 
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Table 4.1 
Attitudes and beliefs about safety of GMOs change scores based on condition. 
 
     M  SD   N 
GMO Correction  .04  .60  36 
GMO Explanation  .25  .61  41 
Control   .15  .51  39 
 
GMO Attitudes & Beliefs about Environmental Impact 
A one-way ANOVA assessing attitude and belief change scores about the 
environmental impact of GMOs and condition, results were significant, F(2, 113) = 
25.416, p < .001, η2 = .31 (see figure 4.3). The GMO correction condition (M = -.15, SD 
= .60) significantly differed from the GMO explanation condition (M = .79, SD = .74), 
t(75) = 6.029, p < .001, d = 1.40. Additionally, the GMO explanation condition 
significantly differed from the control (M = -.01, SD = .52), t(78) = 5.559, p < .001, d = 
1.25.  
 
Figure 4.2. Change scores for attitudes and beliefs about environmental impact of GMOs 
by condition. 
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Given that previous research does not always parse apart belief, attitude, and 
behavior/intention scales, we conducted a one-way ANOVA examining all 13 GMO 
belief, attitude, and behavior/intention scale items by condition (GMO correction, GMO 
explanation, control). Results were significant, F(2, 113) = 16.141, p < .001, η2 = .22 (see 
figure 4.4). Post hoc tests revealed the GMO correction condition (M = .03, SD = .33), 
significantly differed from the GMO explanation condition (M = .43, SD = .43), t(75) = 
4.460, p < .001, d = 1.04. Additionally, the GMO explanation condition also significantly 
differed from the control group (M = .08, SD = .21), t(78) = 4.588, p < .001, d = 1.03. 
 
Figure 4.3. Average change score for all GMO subscales (beliefs, attitudes, beliefs about 
environmental impact of GMOs, implications and intentions of GMOs combined by 
condition. 
 
Exploration of Individual Factors 
Additionally, a series of factorial ANOVAs examining political party preference 
(partisanship) and the various GMO scales (behavior/intentions toward GMOs, GMO 
safety, environmental impact) were all non-significant at p > .10 (see table 4.2), with the 
exception of the 3 X 3 factorial ANOVA examining partisanship (broken down into the 
three main parties as reported in the sample: Republican, Democrat, Independent) and 
condition (GMO correction, GMO explanation, and control) on the GMO perceived 
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environmental impact scale in which the findings for partisanship were not significant, 
F(2, 91) = .940, p = .395, nor was the interaction, F(4, 91) = 1.529, p = .200, however the 
condition variable was significant, F(2, 91) = 20.557,  p < .001. These preliminary pilot 
findings suggested that while the Horne et al. (2015) extended replication was not 
effective, the disease risk approach proposed by Horne and colleagues (also used in Study 
1) might apply to a GMO domain. 
Table 4.2 
GMO attitudes and beliefs about safety of GMOs, environmental impact attitudes and 
beliefs, and behavior/intentions change scores based on political party preference. 
 
GMO Scale        partisanship  M  SD   
Beh./Intent.             Republican .19  .53  
          Democrat .16  .44   
          Independent .06  .35  
GMO Safety           Republican .20  .83   
          Democrat .10  .53 
          Independent -.05  .26 
Envi. Impact.          Republican .16  .78 
          Democrat .27  .68 
          Independent .27  .77 
 
Results 
 Results were analyzed using SPSS version 25. Participants who failed to answer 
all scale items or pass all attention checks were not included in data analysis. After 
excluding participants for failure to pass attention checks – 1000 participants were 
initially recruited – 692 participant responses were analyzed.  
GMO Behavior/Intentions  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted examining the impact of condition (GMO 
correction, explanation condition, control) on GMO behavior/intentions change scores 
(from pre to posttest). Results were significant, F(2, 689) = 27.099, p < .001, η2 = .07 
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(see figure 4.5) Specifically, the GMO correction condition (M = .32, SD = .57) 
compared to the control group (M = .03, SD = .33) showed significant group differences, 
t(461) = 6.771, p < .001, d = .62. There were also significant group differences between 
the GMO explanation condition (M = .36, SD = .64) and control group, t(464) = 6.999, p 
< .001, d = .65.  
 
Figure 4.4. GMO behavior/intentions change score by condition. 
Attitudes and Beliefs about Safety of GMOs 
 A one-way ANOVA examined the impact of condition on GMO attitude change 
scores from pre to posttest. Results were significant, F(2, 689) = 31.033, p < .001, η2 = 
.08 (see figure 4.5). Specifically, the GMO correction condition (M = .27, SD = .75), and 
control group (M = -.09, SD = .49), t(461) = -6.153, p < .001, d = .57. There were also 
significant differences between the GMO explanation condition (M = .38, SD = .78), and 
the control group, t(464) = -7.942, p < .001, d = .72. Finally, an Independent samples t-
test found a marginal difference between the GMO explanation and GMO correction 
conditions on GMO attitude change scores, t(453) = -1.653, p = .099, d = .14. 
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Figure 4.5. Average change score for attitudes and beliefs about safety of GMOs by 
condition. 
Attitudes and Beliefs about Environmental Impact of GMOs 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the influence of condition on attitudes 
and beliefs about environmental impact of GMOs change score. Results were significant, 
F(2, 689) = 66.790, p < 001, η2 = .16 (see figure 4.6). The GMO explanation was the 
most impactful (M = .73, SD = .92), compared to the GMO correction condition (M = .36, 
SD = .71), t(453) = -4.799, p < .001, d = .45, and control (M = -.06, SD = .53), t(464) = -
11.355, p < .001, d = 1.05. Additionally, an Independent samples t-test found a 
significant differences between the GMO correction and control group, t(461) = 7.188, p 
< .001, d = .67. 
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Figure 4.6. Average change score for attitudes and beliefs about environmental impact of 
GMOs by condition. 
 
Influence of Condition on all GMO Scale Items 
When examining all GMO beliefs in tandem (beliefs, attitudes, beliefs about 
environmental impact, and behavior/intentions), results were still significant, F(2, 689) = 
54.825, p < .001, η2 = .14 (see figure 4.7). The GMO explanation condition (M = .45, SD 
= .63), was the most effective in altering GMO beliefs, attitudes, and behavior/intentions, 
compared to the GMO direct correction (M = .32, SD = .54), t(453) = 2.408, p = .016, d  
= .22, and the control group (M = -.02, SD = .26), t(464) = 10.545, p < .001, d = .98. 
Additionally, there were significant group differences noted between the GMO correction 
condition and the control group, t(461) = -8.664, p < .001, d = .80.  
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Figure 4.7. Average change score for all GMO subscales (beliefs, attitudes, beliefs about 
environmental impact of GMOs, and implications and intentions) combined by condition. 
 
Tercile Analyses 
 Similar to Studies 1, 2, and Horne et al. (2015), we examined the effect of GMO 
change score for all GMO subscales combined based on condition and terciles generated 
from participant pretest scores. A 3 X 3 Factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine 
tercile (bottom, middle, top) and condition (GMO correction, GMO explanation, control) 
on GMO belief, attitude, and behavior/intentions full scale change score. As noted above, 
results found a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 683) = 54.397, p < .001, η2 = 
.14. There was also a significant main effect of tercile, F(2, 683) = 4.772, p = .009, η2 = 
.02 (see figure 4.8). The bottom pretest tercile group (M = .32, SD = .67), significantly 
differed from the middle tercile (M = .22, SD = .48), t(470) = 2.035, p = .042, d = .17, as 
well as the control group (M = .19, SD = .41), t(453) = 2.573, p = .01, d = .23. Finally, 
results demonstrated a significant interaction between the two, F(4, 683) = 3.754, p = 
.005, η2 = .02. 
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Figure 4.8. GMO pretest tercile for all subscales (belief, attitude, environmental impact 
beliefs, and behavior/intentions) in tandem based on condition. 
 
Exploration of Individual Factors 
 Similar to the previous studies, results were also analyzed on the basis of political 
party preference (partisanship). Given the findings of the previous chapters, it was no 
surprise that the three most prevalent political parties were: Republican (n = 199; 28.8%), 
Democrat (n = 286, 41.3%), and Independent (n = 129, 18.6%). All other political parties 
(Libertarian, Moderate, non-political) contained less than 45 participants per group. All 
analyses examining partisanship only tested the three main political parties. A series of 
factorial ANOVAs examining partisanship and the various GMO scales (attitudes and 
beliefs about GMO safety, attitudes and beliefs about environmental impact of GMOs, 
and behavior/intentions) were conducted.  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine any potential differences in GMO 
belief pretest measures for all GMO subscale items combined by partisanship. Results 
were significant, F(2, 611) = 5.846, p = .003, η2 = .02 (see figure 4.9). Specifically, 
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Democrats (M = 3.52, SD = 1.13), t(483) = 3.500¸ p = .001, d = .32. There were no 
significant group differences involving Independents (M = 3.40, SD = 1.19).  
 
 
Figure 4.9. GMO pretest tercile for all subscales (GMO safety, environmental impact of 
GMOs, and behavior/intentions) in tandem based on condition. 
 
GMO Behavior/Intentions 
A 3 X 3 factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine the impact of partisanship 
(broken down into the three main parties as reported in the sample: Republican, 
Democrat, Independent) and condition (GMO correction, GMO explanation, and control) 
on the GMO belief subscale change score. Results found a main effect for partisanship, 
F(2, 605) = 3.380, p = .035, η2 = .01 (see figure 4.10). Specifically, there were significant 
group differences between Republicans (M = .16, SD = .46), and Democrats (M = .27, SD 
= .61), t(483) = -2.235, p = .026,  d = .20. There were marginal group differences when 
comparing Republicans to Independents (M = .26, SD = .52), t(326) = -1.883, p = .061, d 
= .20. Results also found a main effect of condition, F(2, 605) = 25.728, p < .001, η2 
=.08, but no significant interaction, F(4, 605) = .293, p = .883.  
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Figure 4.10. GMO behavior/intentions by political party preference. 
Further examination of partisanship and belief change scores, results found an 
initial 47.7% of Republicans held anti-GMO beliefs (scored less than or equal to three of 
the six-point GMO belief scale) (posttest: 40.1% of participants held anti-GMO beliefs). 
Consistent with initial prior findings, on average, Republicans displayed the lowest 
change score from pre to posttest compared to Democrats and Independents. Results 
found 53.3% of Democrats held anti-GMO beliefs prior to receiving any intervention. 
This number dropped to 48.7% in posttest. Finally, 48.8% of Independents held anti-
GMO attitudes, a number that dropped to 38.8% in posttest. 
Attitudes and Beliefs about Safety of GMOs 
Similar findings were found when examining partisanship and condition on 
attitudes and beliefs about the safety of GMOs change scores from pre to posttest. A 3 X 
3 factorial ANOVA found a marginal effect of partisanship, F(2, 605) = 2.432, p = .089, 
η2 = .01 (see figure 4.11). There were marginal group differences between Republicans 
(M = .11, SD = .68), and Independents (M = .25, SD = .65), t(326) = 1.853, p = .065, d = 
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.21. There were no significant group differences involving Democrats (M = .20, SD = 
.75). 
 
Figure 4.11. Average change score for attitudes and beliefs about safety of GMOs by 
political party preference. 
 Results also found a main effect of condition, F(2, 605) = 25.251, p < .001, η2 = 
.08, but no significant interaction between the two, F(4, 605) = 1.123, p = .345, η2 = .01. 
Furthermore, on average, Republicans again showed the smallest change in attitude from 
pre to posttest, with 44.7% displaying anti-GMO attitudes at pretest and posttest. Of 
Democrat pretest scores, 37.8% held anti-GMO scores while 30.1% of Democrats 
reported anti-GMO attitudes at posttest. For Independents, 41.9% of pretest scores were 
considered anti-GMO, compared to 36.4% of participants posttest. 
Attitudes & Beliefs about Environmental Impact of GMOs 
Repeating the previous analysis apart from using the change score on beliefs 
about environmental impact of GMOs. Unlike previous subscale findings, there was no 
main effect of partisanship, F(2, 605) = .043, p = .958, however, there was a main effect 
of condition, F(2, 605) = 51.205, p < .001, η2 = .15, and no significant interaction, F(4, 
605) = 1.916, p = .106. These results may at first glance seem surprising given the 
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previous literature on partisanship and concern for the environment (Van Bavel & 
Periera, 2018; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). However, it is possible that 
individuals at pretest were entirely unaware of how GMOs might impact the 
environment. 
On average, at pretest, 32.2% of Republicans held anti-GMO attitudes at pretest 
while 22.1% reported those attitudes at posttest. Of Democrat pretest scores, 29% held 
anti-GMO views while 18.2% of Democrats reported anti-GMO attitudes at posttest. For 
Independents, 35.7% of pretest scores were considered anti-GMO, compared to 25.6% of 
participants posttest. 
Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to examine the effectiveness of a GMO 
explanation condition – designed to parallel the vaccine disease risk condition – on 
altering individual beliefs, attitudes, and behavior/intentions toward GMOs. The initial 
pilot findings reported in Study 3a found GMO change scores for attitudes and beliefs 
about GMO safety, attitudes and beliefs about the environmental impact of GMOs, and 
behavior/intentions toward GMOs were significantly impacted by the GMO explanation 
condition. Additionally, when examining all GMO scale items in tandem, the GMO 
explanation was the most effective at altering individual attitudes, beliefs, and 
behavior/intentions toward GMOs. Given the most effective condition in the current 
study was designed to parallel the vaccine disease risk model proposed by Horne et al 
(2015), these results further support the argument that the most successful misinformation 
correction approach is to focus on the risks posed to the individual and society when 
people fail to engage in a certain behavior. Furthermore, not only do these findings 
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support the proposed correction intervention of Horne and colleagues (2015), it also 
demonstrates that similar misinformation correction approaches may be applicable in 
different contexts. 
Study 3b, with its larger sample size, showed similar findings. The GMO 
explanation condition – designed to be equivalent to the vaccine disease risk condition – 
was the most effective at altering GMO attitudes and beliefs about GMO safety, and 
attitudes and beliefs about the environmental impact of GMOs. Additionally, when all 
GMO scale items were grouped together, the GMO explanation condition was still the 
most effective at altering individual attitudes, beliefs, and behavior/intentions toward 
GMOs. The GMO behavior/intentions scale was the only measurement in which the 
explanation condition was just was effective as the GMO correction condition (designed 
to parallel the alternate autism correction condition generated in Study 2). 
Further exploration of individual factors and GMO measurements – specifically, 
partisanship and its influence on GMO attitudes, beliefs, and behavior/intentions – found 
that with the exception of attitudes and beliefs about the environmental impact of GMOs, 
there was a consistent marginal effect of partisanship on all GMO subscale change scores 
from pre to posttest. Specifically, when examining the three main political parties in 
isolation (Republican, Democrat, Independent) Republicans consistently demonstrated 
lower change scores from pre to posttest compared to Democrats and Independents. 
Furthermore, Democrats demonstrated the highest GMO baseline scores, a finding that 
was a bit surprising given the push for some groups of Democrats to label and identify 
GMO foods (Berning & Campbell, 2017). 
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Finally, results of a tercile analysis found an interaction between condition and 
tercile, suggesting that the ability for individuals to alter their attitudes, beliefs, and 
behavior/intentions toward GMOs may impacted by which misinformation correction 
approach one is exposed to, in addition to their baseline values without intervention. 
While the results are very clear and the GMO explanation condition is the most effective, 
the results of the tercile analyses should be considered in the future when generating 
additional GMO misinformation correction approaches. 
Overall, these findings suggest that: (1) a condition designed to parallel the 
disease risk condition developed by Horne et al. (2015) is effective in multiple contexts, 
(2) when using an expected utility approach, misinformation correction tactics that 
highlight the negative consequences of not engaging in a particular behavior – in this case 
human consumption of GMOs – are successful at altering attitudes, beliefs, and 
behavior/intentions toward GMOs. While Studies 3a and 3b were not designed to address 
the GMO debate one way or another, these findings further support the argument that the 
use of a “disease risk” framework is an effective and successful approach to alter 
individual attitudes and correct for misinformation for individuals who oppose the human 
consumption of GMOs.  
Future studies should also consider a more extensive examination of the degree to 
which partisanship influences general GMO attitudes and beliefs. As mentioned 
previously, there are notable differences in individual beliefs when partisanship is 
examined. Specifically, there are differences in a number of scientific issues, including 
climate change, on which political parties differ (Van Bavel & Periera, 2018; Rutjens, 
Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018). Given these findings, future studies that wish to continue 
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the exploration of GMO misinformation correction approaches should also consider 
including more political viewpoints about GMOs. 
Overall, both the environmental explanation and the GMO correction conditions 
were effective in altering beliefs and attitudes (though there was some benefit for the 
explanation condition on some outcomes). GMO beliefs and attitudes may be easier to 
alter than vaccine beliefs and attitudes. One possible explanation for this difference is that 
people may have less knowledge about GMOs and thus less entrenched beliefs about 
them. Supporting this idea is that most people scored in the “neutral” range on the initial 
survey of GMOs. In contrast, the vaccine-autism debate is well known and is commonly 
discussed in the media. This is not the case for GMOs. Genetically modified organisms in 
food have been prevalent in crops for the past several decades, yet the non-GMO 
movement is relatively new (Roff, 2009). Future researchers wanting to further pursue 
misinformation correction approaches, whether they be for GMOs, vaccines, or 
something else entirely, should consider the indirect impact that topic novelty may have 
on participants. 
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Appendix 
Assessment Scales used for Studies 3a & 3b: 
For the following scale, participants were asked to rate the frequency with which they 
engage in the following behaviors with each of these items on a five-point Likert scale 
from Never to Always (never, rarely, sometimes, often, always). 
 
Please respond with how frequently you participate in the following behaviors: 
 
1. I avoid consuming genetically modified foods. 
2. I read packaging labels to avoid buying genetically modified items. 
3. I buy food products made with genetically modified organisms. 
 
For the following scales, participants were asked to rate their agreement with each of 
these items on a six-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
 
GMO Behavior/Intentions Scale 
 
1. I believe it is important to avoid consuming genetically modified foods. 
2. I believe that it is important to read packaging labels to avoid buying genetically 
modified items. 
3. I believe that it is good to buy food products made with genetically modified 
organisms. 
4.  I would be willing to pay more to avoid consuming genetically modified 
organisms. 
5. I am concerned about consuming items made with genetically modified 
organisms. 
6. I think there should be labels on genetically modified organisms in food. 
7. I think genetic modification of foods should be made illegal in the U.S. 
 
GMO Attitudes and Beliefs about Safety Scale 
 
1. Genetically modified organisms in food pose a threat to human health. 
2. Genetic modification of food products is unnatural. 
3. Genetically modified organisms are safe for human consumption. 
 
GMO Attitudes and Beliefs about Environmental Impact Scale 
 
1. Genetic modification of food products is harmful to the environment. 
2. Genetically modified organisms are beneficially to the environment. 
3. Genetically modified foods reduce human exposure to pesticides. 
In addition to the GMO scales provided, the morality distractor scales (consequentialism, 
abortion, and euthanasia) previously used in Horne et al. (2015) will also be included in 
this study. 
 
GMO Correction Condition 
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Please examine the following information about genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) carefully. 
  
You may worry that human consumption of foods made with genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) is harmful, but research has actually found that consuming GMO 
foods is safe for human consumption. Indeed, the World Health Organization, the 
American Medical Association, and the National Academy of Sciences all agree there is 
“no good evidence to suggest GMOs are unsafe.” 
 
The idea of genetically-modified plants sounds scary to many consumers. As a new 
parent, Jacob Sanders wants the best for his toddler. He buys organic, non-GMO foods as 
often as possible. He cooks her healthy meals with minimally processed ingredients and 
many vegetables. He says “why take a chance on GMOs when non-GMO food is clearly 
labeled and wouldn’t have the risk of GMOs?”. 
 
Why are people so concerned about GMOs? First, it seems as though modifying genes is 
“unnatural” and therefore potentially dangerous. Why mess around with plants that have 
been safely eaten for hundreds of years by changing their genetic characteristics? 
Furthermore, why trust agribusiness – the same industry responsible for rampant use of 
pesticides and herbicides, overuse of antibiotics, soil erosion, water contamination, and 
tomatoes that taste like cardboard? In general, the idea of genetically modified foods 
sounds potentially risky. 
 
Decades of research, however, has found that GMOs are completely safe for human 
consumption; in many ways, they are even safer than non-GMO foods. For example, 
GMO foods are frequently being engineered to be resistant to common pests and 
therefore require fewer pesticides. At the same time, some agribusinesses actually benefit 
from consumer concerns. If these businesses can convince consumers to pay more to buy 
non-GMO foods, they can increase their sales and profits. 
 
Given that both sides – pro-GMO and anti-GMO businesses – have skin in the game, 
what is the truth? 
 
Research has found no evidence to suggest that foods made with GMOs are unsafe for 
human consumption. Please look over the following graphs displaying the truth behind 
GMOs. 
 
National Academy of the Sciences 
The National Academies of the Science, Engineering, and Medicine conducted a review 
of over 900 studies and publication found that consuming foods made with GMOs is just 
as safe as consuming foods made without GMOs. 
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Figure 4.A1. Illustration of GMO safety research presented to participants in GMO 
correction condition. 
 
Norris 
Researchers are working to develop genetically modified foods that produce more health 
benefits, such as: golden yellow rise that contains more vitamin A to combat vision 
ailments and other deficiencies, pineapples that contain lycopene (a tomato-based 
pigment) which is an antioxidant that may prevent cancer, and the antioxidant properties 
noted in blueberries is being engineered in tomatoes. Despite these many genetic 
modifications, research has found no health and or toxicity concerns for human 
consumption of GMOs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.A2. Illustration of lack of human harm from consuming GMOs presented to 
participants in GMO correction condition. 
 
GENetic Engineering Risk Atlas (GENERA) 2014 
The following graph displays data from GENERA of 197 peer-reviewed scientific studies 
that address the safety of foods made with genetically modified ingredients. A vast 
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majority of the studies found no difference in foods made with GMOs compared to non-
GMO foods. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.A3. Illustration of GMO scientific literature on safety of GMOs research 
presented to participants in GMO correction condition. 
 
GMO Explanation Condition 
 
Please read the following information about genetically modified organisms 
carefully. 
 
While there are fears surrounding genetically modified organisms (GMOs), there is 
resounding evidence that GMOs are completely safe for human consumption. In fact, not 
only are GMOs safe, but they also have significant benefits due to increased crop yields, 
increased plant resiliency, reduction in use of pesticides and herbicides, and reduced 
exposure to diseases.  
 
Adequate and safe food is a concern for Cecilia Ramirez. As a new parent, she wants the 
best for her toddler. Corn is a major part of her family's diet, and she is very concerned 
that the corn be safe, and used to avoid foods that were labeled as having GMOs or 
pesticides. Her niece died of liver failure after consuming corn containing mycotoxin, a 
fungus called Aspergillus. She later learned that GMO corn, which she had previously 
avoided, actually reduces the prevalence of mycotoxins because GMO corn is more 
resistant to pests such as the corn borer. In turn, the corn requires fewer pesticides to be 
grown and also is less likely to be infested with corn borers that in turn would make them 
susceptible to mycotoxin growth. Now, she knows that GMO foods are not only safe, but 
also reduce her child's exposure to known toxins such as fungi and pesticides. 
 
Humans started farming over 10,000 years ago. Throughout these millennia, the 
population has continued to increase and with this population growth has been a 
corresponding increase in crop production. Since 1950, the world's population has more 
than doubled and to feed all of the world, and all Americans, it is necessary to either 
   
 
120 
 
increase farmland (by destroying the wilderness) or to increase crop yield. GMOs have 
been a key approach to increasing crop yield. 
 
Furthermore, many species of plants have been destroyed, or nearly destroyed, by disease 
and pests. The Hawaiian papaya, for example, was nearly extinct due to infestation by the 
ringspot virus. If not for the genetic engineered version. However, genetic engineering 
has led to the creation of a version of the papaya that can destroy the virus. Other plants 
at risk include the common Cavendish banana, which is slowly being destroyed by a 
fungus throughout the world. 
 
Foods made with GMOs are not hazardous for human consumption. However, there are 
many benefits of GMOs for the environment as well as for the individuals. Please read 
the descriptions of some GMO benefits and carefully view the pictures. 
 
Higher Crop Yield & Resiliency 
Foods made with GMOs are less susceptible to the potential damages that arise with 
weeds, insects, and other crop damaging factors; this naturally leads to a higher crop 
yield in crop production for GMO-based plants (James, 2014). In addition, foods made 
with GMOs also tend to be more resilient to harsh and adverse weather patterns than non-
GMO crops (Font, 2011; Mintz, 2017). The higher crop yield that GMOs promote, which 
is a direct result of a reduction in losses due to the pest and weed control, further supports 
the notion that GMOs have positive environmental benefits (Mannion & Morse, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.A4. Illustration of comparison of GMO to non-GMO crops presented to 
participants in GMO explanation condition. 
 
Carter and Greene (2014) 
The following graph shows that global hunger has been slowly declining in the past 
decades. Due to the higher crop yield and increased resiliency GMO crops have, the 
decline in global hunger is often attributed to the use of GMOs in foods. 
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Figure 4.A5. Illustration of benefit of GMOs on global hunger decline presented to 
participants in GMO explanation condition. 
 
University of California Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources 
The following highlights the many beneficial environmental impacts that arise due to the 
use of GMOs on crops, such as a reduction in CO2 emissions, less use of pesticides, and 
a reduction in the amount of land needed to produce the same amount of food. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.A6. Illustration of the benefits of GMOs on the environment presented to 
participants in the GMO explanation condition. 
 
Control (Horne et al., 2015) 
 
   
 
122 
 
Please examine the following information about bird feeding carefully. 
 
Q: What are the costs and benefits of bird feeding? 
 
A: It is difficult to assess the costs and benefits of bird feeding because it is difficult to 
compare the health of birds without access to feeders with birds that frequent feeders. 
Only one study was able to obtain some sound results. That study found that any benefits 
of feeding only appear to occur sporadically under extreme climactic conditions. No 
research has been able to demonstrate a cost. Aside from costs and benefits to birds, there 
is a cost and benefit to humanity. The costs are obvious – the expense of bird feeding 
supplies. 
 
The benefits include learning more about birds and the joy of connecting with the natural 
world. Bird feeding provides a direct, intimate view of the natural world for more than 50 
million Americans who feed the birds in their yards. It is most popular in winter, when 
birds seem to need the most help. Some people worry that birds will suffer unless they 
make great efforts to the feeder filled, but research indicates that most birds do not 
depend on feeders.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The goal of my dissertation was to examine the effectiveness of various 
misinformation correction approaches to alter individual attitudes, beliefs, and future 
intentions toward specific topics. Specifically, this dissertation addressed approaches to 
correct the false belief “vaccines cause autism”, and the false belief that genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) are hazardous for human consumption. Across a series of 
studies, I found framing misinformation correction tactics that focused on how vaccines 
and GMOs reduce risks posed to the individual, environment, and society is, for the most 
part effective at altering individual attitudes, beliefs, and intentions toward a given topic 
and has the ability to transcend contexts However, this effect is not very robust in certain 
contexts and it is not clear how replicable the current findings might be.  
Summary of Key Findings 
 Study 1 further supported previous findings by Horne et al. (2015) that suggested 
altering attitudes is possible when posing information in terms of a disease risk – posing 
arguments in terms of the risks the vaccine preventable diseases pose to the individual if 
they fail to vaccinate. This disease risk condition was more effective than a direct autism 
correction approach. Additionally, a comparison of the autism correction condition 
against the control found a marginal effect of condition on vaccine attitude change score. 
These findings suggest that while an autism correction condition may not be as effective 
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at altering individual vaccine attitudes as a disease risk approach, it is somewhat 
impactful when examined in isolation. In other words, a direct misinformation correction 
condition may be better than no misinformation correction condition. After parsing the 
vaccine scale in to separate subscales measuring different vaccine values, marginal 
effects of condition on vaccine intention were found. Similar to Horne et al. (2015), 
Study 1 found no significant differences in vaccine attitude change score when taking 
into account parent status. An exploratory analysis on hidden question six, the main 
misconception surrounding vaccines and autism (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy 
children”), found significant group differences, with the autism correction condition 
showing the most change from pre to posttest. Furthermore, additional analyses found 
Republicans consistently displayed the lowest vaccine attitude score average when 
compared to Democrats and Independents.  
While the results of Study 1 found the disease risk condition to be the most 
effective at altering vaccine attitudes, extended replication Study 2 failed to replicate 
those same findings; rather the was no effect of condition on vaccine attitude change 
score. None of the proposed misinformation correction conditions, including the 
previously effective disease risk condition as demonstrated in Study 1 and Horne et al. 
(2015), were effective at altering individual vaccine attitudes compared to the control 
condition. For Study 2, the examination of hidden question six by condition was 
significant when considering all five conditions, with the most effective condition for this 
scale item being the newly extended alternate autism correction condition. One similarity 
in findings from Horne and colleagues (2015), Study 1, and Study 2 was that there was 
no significant impact of parent status on vaccine attitude change score. Other exploratory 
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analyses of Study 2 yielded interesting findings. Specifically, there were significant 
differences in partisanship in baseline vaccine attitudes. Consistent with previous 
exploratory findings, Republicans – while still slightly pro-vaccine – demonstrated the 
lowest baseline vaccine attitudes compared to Democrats and Independents.  
While the findings from Studies 1 and 2 were inconclusive, Studies 3a and 3b 
were designed to examine a paralleled disease risk misinformation correction approach in 
a different context than vaccines. Initial results for Study 3a suggested that a disease risk 
parallel GMO condition (i.e., GMO explanation condition) that highlighted the 
detrimental impacts on society and the environment intervention strategy was effective at 
altering some aspects of beliefs, attitudes, and behavior/intentions about human 
consumption of GMO foods. Specifically, Study 3a found a marginal effect of condition 
on GMO behavior/intentions, with the GMO explanation condition being the most 
influential. While there was no significant impact of condition on GMO attitudes and 
beliefs about GMO safety change score, results demonstrated when examining condition 
and change score of GMO behavior/intentions as well as beliefs about the environmental 
impact of GMOs, there were significant group differences. Though exploratory 
partisanship analyses in the previous two studies showed interesting differences, Study 3a 
found no differences in GMO beliefs, attitudes, and behavior/intentions as a function of 
partisanship. Finally, Study 3b found the GMO explanation condition to be effective at 
altering GMO attitudes and beliefs about GMO safety, beliefs about the environmental 
impact of GMOs, and behavior/intentions toward GMOs. Additionally, within a GMO 
specific context, direct misinformation correction approaches – designed to parallel the 
vaccine autism correction approach seen in Study 1 – were also effective at altering GMO 
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attitudes and beliefs about GMO safety, environmental impacts, and behavior/intentions 
when compared to a control. Further exploratory analyses of individual factors – 
specifically partisanship – found that while on average Republicans held more anti-GMO 
attitudes and beliefs, these individuals were also the least likely to show change in those 
attitudes and beliefs compared to Democrats and Independents. 
Overall, these findings seem to suggest the misinformation correction approach 
proposed by Horne et al. (2015) may be the most effective at altering individual attitudes, 
beliefs, and future intentions. Furthermore, these findings may appear to be more robust 
and therefore more easily replicated in certain contexts than others. Specifically, in 
contexts that are newer – newer in terms of how readily available information is – 
individual attitudes toward those topics may not be as polarized as other topics such as: 
capital punishment, gun control, and abortion (Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979; Wolpert & 
Gimpel, 1998; DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996)  
Theoretical Practical Implications & Limitations 
 One very noticeable characteristic of the misinformation correction literature in 
general, and the findings of this dissertation specifically, is inconsistency of results. One 
possible reason for inconsistent findings may have to do with the assessment of attitudes, 
beliefs, and intentions used in many studies. It is possible that interventions have very 
specific impacts, and overall scales may fail to capture these specific outcomes; scales 
need to be better designed to have multiple items that separately assess different beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors. In addition, individual differences in prior knowledge about 
topics may interact with the effectiveness of interventions and they are not always 
assessed. And unfortunately, not all assessments directly assess misinformation. The brief 
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five-item scale in the Horne et al. (2015) study, for example, did not include the question 
about vaccines causing autism (hidden question six). If individual interventions address 
different beliefs, but beliefs are only assessed by a single scale, then how these 
interventions specifically impact beliefs is not addressed. This is problematic in the 
vaccine literature, as the current findings suggest that direct correction of the 
misconception that vaccines cause autism may actually reduce that specific belief (rather 
than resulting in a backfire effect) but not other beliefs about vaccines. 
Previous research has also demonstrated the effectiveness of different 
misinformation correction approaches on different assessments of individual items or 
subscales (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, intentions) (Nyhan & Reifler, 2013; Betsch, Korn, and 
Holtmann (2015)). This could also explain why researchers such as Nyhan, Reifler, 
Richey, and Freed (2014) obtained different results when parsing out vaccine-autism 
survey questions compared to the results demonstrated by Horne et al. (2015).  
In addition to more subscales, the inclusion items assessing participant knowledge 
and experience could aid in determining effective misinformation correction approaches. 
Specifically, these items should include assessments of: what participants already know 
about the vaccine-autism debate, if they have a close family member who holds anti-
vaccine beliefs, and do they personally know an individual who has been diagnosed with 
autism. These items may help researchers identify potential reasons behind pretest 
vaccine attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore, having that information could help researchers 
investigate if individual exposure and knowledge of issues about vaccines is related to the 
ability to alter individual attitudes and beliefs. The newly self-generated attitude, belief, 
and intention subscales created for Studies 3a and 3b capture different aspects of an 
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individual’s values. This formation of subscales may explain why the results of the two 
GMO studies in this dissertation were robust and replicated while the vaccine studies 
using similar misinformation correction approaches yielded different results (such as seen 
in Studies 1, 2, and Horne et al., 2015). 
  The vaccine-autism “link” has been incorrectly believed since its introduction in 
the early 1990s. It could be that over time, individuals have less malleable views of 
vaccines and autism, affecting the replicability of previous findings (as seen in Study 1, 
2, and Horne et al., (2015)). Although only four years have passed since the initial Horne 
et al. (2015) study was published, it is possible that beliefs are more entrenched than they 
were. 
The relatively large effect size and robustness of the GMO interventions in this 
dissertation could be due to the fact that individuals hold less entrenched beliefs about 
GMOs. As the use of GMOs in food products is being discussed more in the media and 
news, GMOs are becoming more prevalent in people’s minds. As the discussion 
surrounding this topic increases so does the possibility of encountering misinformation 
about GMOs (Linnhoff, Martin, & Smith, 2017; Maghari & Ardekani, 2011). Perhaps it 
is the case that novelty of a topic is influential in altering attitudes, beliefs, and intentions. 
Future Directions 
One future direction would be to continue to examine misinformation correction 
approaches that focus on highlighting the positive aspects of engaging in different 
behaviors in different contexts. For example, one could use a similar misinformation 
correction approach in an airplane safety scenario to alter individual attitudes, beliefs, and 
future intentions about flying. Roughly about 10-25% of the population has a fear of 
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flying based on an inaccurate underestimation of the safety of flying (Rothbaum, Hodges, 
Smith, Lee, & Price, 2000). Though airplanes are routinely checked for safety concerns 
and flying is a mode of transportation many individuals rely on, some people are still 
fearful of flying, with some avoiding it entirely. If the correction approach proposed by 
Horne et al. (2015) remains consistent across contexts outside of GMOs, then it may be 
possible to alter attitudes, beliefs, and intentions toward a number of issues such as 
correcting fear of flying beliefs.  
Additionally, future studies of misinformation correction should also include 
individual difference factors such as dogmatism and degree of openness of participants. 
Dogmatism can be thought of as a personal bias that can influence decision-making. 
Rokeach (1954, p. 195) describes dogmatism as a “a relatively closed cognitive 
organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality”. In other words, it is the degree to 
which an individual displays belief rigidity. Future examination of these individual 
differences should consider tailoring these scales such as the dogmatism scale based on 
the topic one is investigating. For example, a future study of misinformation correction of 
GMOs may benefit from knowing more about individual levels of participant dogmatism 
toward GMOs. I predict that, individuals who possess high traits of dogmatism would be 
less likely to alter their attitudes, beliefs, and future intentions regardless of 
misinformation correction approach. On the contrary, individuals who possess high levels 
of openness may be more easily influenced by misinformation correction approaches. An 
assessment of participant levels of openness, researchers would have a better 
comprehension of participant thoughts attitude alteration.  
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A recent meta-analysis examining the factors that underly effective 
misinformation correction approaches provides further recommendations (Chan, Jones, 
Jamieson, & Albarracin, 2017). Firstly, the detailed account of reasons why 
misinformation may have been spread may in fact make it difficult for individuals to 
process new information countering those initial beliefs. Instead, reports of 
misinformation correction should address the misinformation with a reduction in the 
elaboration surrounding that topic. Under this recommendation, the retraction of 
misinformation should be discussed in ways that “reduce detailed thoughts in support of 
the misinformation”. Secondly, counter-arguments are not effective. Rather than arguing 
from an oppositional standpoint (i.e., counter-argument), researchers should develop 
misinformation correction approaches that from level of skepticism. While counter-
arguments may not be effective for topics in which people may be more entrenched in 
their thinking (e.g., vaccines), instances in which individual stance toward a topic is more 
neutral – as seen in the GMO studies – counter-arguments may be just as effective as 
other correctional approaches. Finally, counter-arguments that are direct in their approach 
– as demonstrated with the autism correction condition – make individuals less likely to 
accept those correction messages (Chan, Jones, Jamieson, & Albarracin, 2017). 
Closing Remarks 
Altering beliefs and attitudes is quite a complex endeavor. On one hand, the 
findings of the present series of studies suggest that a disease risk approach may be the 
most effective in multiple contexts for correcting misinformation and altering attitudes, 
but it is not always successful. One possibility is that different misinformation correction 
approaches may need to be applied to different misinformation correction topics or for 
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different individuals. Perhaps there are misinformation correction tactics yet to be 
explored or discovered.  
  
   
 
132 
 
References 
 
Betsch, C., Korn, L., & Holtmann, C. (2015). Don’t try to convert the antivaccinators, 
instead target the fence-sitters. PNAS, 112(49), 6725-6726. 
Chan, M. S., Jones, C. R., Jamieson, K. H. & Albarracin, D. (2017). Debunking: A meta-
analysis of the psychological efficacy of messages countering misinformation. 
Psychological Science, 28(11), 1531-1546. 
DiMaggio, P., Evans, J., & Bryson, B. (1996). Have American’s social attitudes become 
more polarized? American Journal of Sociology, 102(3) 690-755. 
Horne, Z., Powell, D., Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2015). Countering 
antivaccination attitudes.  PNAS, 112(33), 10321-10324. 
Linnhoff, S., Volovich, E., Martin, H., & Smith, M. (2017). An examination of 
millennials' attitudes toward genetically modified organism (GMO) foods: Is it 
franken-food or super-food? International Journal of Agricultural Resources, 
Governance and Ecology, 13(4), 371-390. 
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11), 2098-2109. 
Maghari, B. M., & Ardekani, A. M. (2011). Genetically modified foods and social 
concerns. Avicenna Journal of Medical Biotechnology, 3(3), 109-117. 
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2013). Which corrections work? Research results and practice 
recommendations. New American Foundation, 2-15. 
Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., Richey, S., & Freed, G. L. (2014). Effective messages in vaccine 
promotion: A randomized trial.  Pediatrics, 133(4), 835-842. 
   
 
133 
 
Rokeach, M. (1954). The nature and meaning of dogmatism. Psychological Review, 61, 
194-204. 
Rothbaum, B. O., Hodges, L., Smith, S., Lee, J. H., & Price, L. (2000). A controlled 
study of virtual reality exposure therapy for the fear of flying. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 68(6). 1020-1026. 
Wolpert, R. M., & Gimpel, J. G. (1998). Self-interest, symbolic politics, and public 
attitudes toward gun control. Political Behavior, 20(3), 241-262. 
